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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 970200 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
statements obtained in violation of the 5th, 6th, and 14th 
Amendments of the federal constitution, art. I, § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A bifurcated standard applies with 
respect to the first issue. This Court will review the trial 
court's factual findings for clear error, State v. Troyer, 910 
P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995), and the conclusions of law under a 
correctness standard providing no deference to the trial court. 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
evidence discovered during a warrantless search of Kiriluk's 
apartment, where officers obtained consent to search in violation 
of Kiriluk's constitutional rights and rights per Miranda. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard set forth at 1 applies. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the state's 
evidence that liquid found in Kiriluk's room constituted an 
illegal substance, where such evidence was based on Detective 
Winters' observations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An admissibility decision is the 'sum 
of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed under a 
separate standard' of review." State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 
(Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). This Court will apply a 
"correction of error standard to the legal content of the trial 
court's ruling" to admit the evidence. 
In reviewing the legal content, we examine (1) whether the 
trial court selected the correct rule of evidence, (2) 
whether the trial court correctly interpreted that rule, and 
(3) whether the trial court correctly applied the rule. 
Id. The Court will apply an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing that aspect of the trial court's ruling that the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudice. Id. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence 
statements concerning serology test results, where the state (a) 
withheld the results in violation of its duty to provide 
continuing discovery, and (b) failed to comply with State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), in presenting the evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: With respect to Kiriluk's motion for a 
new trial on the basis that the state violated discovery rules, 
this Court will review the trial court's ruling under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 
1992). As for of an admissibility decision, see the Standard of 
Review set forth at 3, above. 
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5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to admonish 
the jury to disregard hearsay testimony that Kiriluk committed 
the murder, and whether such testimony violated Kiriluk's rights 
under the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will review the trial court's 
factual findings for clear error, State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 
1186 (Utah 1995), and the conclusions of law, including 
constitutional questions, for correctness providing no deference 
to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
6. Whether the cumulative effect of the irregularities and 
errors in the case prevented Kiriluk from receiving a fair trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW; The cumulative error doctrine supports 
reversal where the cumulative effect of the errors undermines the 
confidence of this Court in its belief that Kiriluk had a fair 
trial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue concerning suppression of Kiriluk's in-
custody statements is preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 
R. 126-27; the second issue is preserved at R. 72-113, 329-481; 
the third issues is preserved at R. 564-66, 941; and the fourth 
issue is preserved at R. 43-45, 69-70, 133-37, 1004-05, 1017-23. 
With respect to the fifth issue, Kiriluk's counsel objected to 
hearsay evidence elicited from the state's witness and asked that 
the court strike the testimony and provide a curative instruction 
at R. 942, 972-73. 
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Although the sixth issue was not specifically argued at 
trial, this Court may assess whether the cumulative effect of the 
errors undermines this Court's confidence in its belief that 
Kiriluk had a fair trial. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. 
RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules and constitutional provisions will be 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Rules of Evidence 702 and 801-804 (1998). 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 (1998) . 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12, and 14. 
U.S. Const, amends. IV, V, VI, and XIV. 
The text of the provisions is contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In the spring of 1996, Kiriluk and co-defendants Damon 
Munford ("Damon") and Rebecca Munford ("Rebecca") were charged by 
Amended Information with criminal homicide, murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1997). (R. 8-9; 11-19.) Prior to trial, Kiriluk engaged in 
discovery (R. 31-49; 53-55; 63-70; 124-25; 128-51), and moved for 
the entry of an order to suppress statements and evidence seized 
in violation of his constitutional rights. (R. 72-113; 126-27.) 
The trial court denied the motions. (R. 121-22; 476-80.) 
Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury, which found him 
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guilty. (R. 279-81.) The court sentenced Kiriluk to prison for 
an indeterminate period from 5 years to life. (R. 283.) Kiriluk 
is appealing from the final judgment. (See R. 295-96.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kiriluk, Damon and Rebecca were arrested and charged with 
murdering Michael Brown. (R. 14-19.) During a pre-trial hearing, 
the state's witnesses testified as follows with respect to the 
circumstances surrounding a warrantless search: 
On March 25, 1996, three officers went to Kiriluk7s 
apartment at midnight. (R. 360-61; 373-74; 393-94.) When they 
entered, they observed Frank Crogman sitting on the sofa, a tree 
branch on a shelf, glass jars with strainers on the tops and a 
quart of acetone in the kitchen. (R. 364; 3 97-98.) 
Sergeant Carr informed Kiriluk he wanted to ask questions 
regarding Brown's death. Kiriluk agreed to go with Carr to the 
police station for interrogation. (R. 364-66; 1007.) 
Officers Mazurin and Townsend stayed to run a check on 
Crogman. They discovered warrants outstanding for his arrest, 
placed him in handcuffs, conducted a sweep search (R. 3 99, 421, 
4 02) , and "observed several items that had [a] reference to 
narcotics." (R. 403-04.) The officers also arrested Chablis 
Scott ("Chablis"), who was sleeping in a back room, and two other 
persons who came to the door with drugs: Jolynn Penrod ("Jolynn") 
and Toby Parcell. (R. 4 06-08.) 
At some point, Townsend called for a narcotics unit to 
assist in a search of the premises. (R. 402-04.) The arrested 
5 
persons were removed from the apartment. 
At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Winters from narcotics 
arrived. (R. 408.) Townsend and Mazurin let Winters in. (R. 445.) 
Thereafter, Townsend called Carr at the police station and told 
Carr about drug paraphernalia on the premises. (R. 378-79.) 
Carr relayed the information to Kiriluk, informed Kiriluk he 
was going to be arrested at least for drug possession, reminded 
Kiriluk of his rights per Miranda, and asked if Kiriluk wanted to 
make a statement. Kiriluk stated "I don't." A copy of the 
interrogation transcript is attached as Addendum B ("Addendum 
B"). The excerpt is found at pages 32-34. (See also R. 476.) 
Approximately three minutes later, Winters interrupted the 
interrogation with a second call, where he spoke to Kiriluk 
regarding the narcotics that were found at the apartment. Winters 
requested consent to search. Kiriluk said "yes." (Addendum B at 
37.) Winters resumed the search (R. 409; 441; 940-41), and found 
the following items in Kiriluk's bedroom: 
Butane bottles, a lighting mechanism. That's used to smoke 
it, etc. Glassware, methamphetamine, and address book, meth 
recipe, a mirror that was used to separate it, smoking 
pipes, a scale, another finger scale, a wallet with some 
currency in it, several blocks of stamps, which I believed 
to be L.S.D., a .357 magnum with a holster, and 
approximately five to six pounds of precursor, and another 
recipe and scales were found [in Jolynn's] bedroom. 
(R. 441; 941-42; 948; 951; 955.) Winters found more glassware in 
the kitchen with a "white substance in the bottom." (R. 442.) 
The judge denied Kiriluk's motion to suppress evidence 
seized from the apartment on the basis that Kiriluk consented to 
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the search. (R. 476-80.) In addition, the judge allowed the 
state to present direct evidence at trial through Winters that 
jars found in Kiriluk's room contained a "main ingredient" or 
precursor used in the production of methamphetamine. (R. 941; 
948; 951; 955.) Winters' conclusions were based on his 
observations, since a field test he conducted flashed 
inconclusive for an illegal substance. (R. 953-55.)x 
Additional trial testimony reflected the following.2 
The state's witness, Jolynn, testified that in early March 
1996 she observed that Kiriluk was angry and told Brown he would 
kill him for "ripping off" a precursor used to manufacture meth-
amphetamine. 1R. 730-31.) Jolynn also observed that during the 
middle of March 1996 Kiriluk was "afraid for his life" because he 
owed money on missing precursor. (R. 732; see also 760; 864-66.) 
On about March 10, Damon and Rebecca began associating with 
Kiriluk (R. 734; 902), allegedly to "act as back-up muscle to 
intimidate" Brown. (R. 866.) 
Chablis testified that on March 21, 1996, Kiriluk and Damon 
brought Brown to Kiriluk's apartment. (R. 764.) According to 
Rebecca, Kiriluk interrogated Brown about the precursor, then 
1
 At trial Winters testified that he sent the jars to the 
crime lab for testing. (R. 951.) He also testified that a toxi-
cology report existed but that he did not have it at the time of 
trial. Winters stated the prosecutor had the report. (Id.) The re-
sults of the toxicology test were never disclosed to the defense. 
Winters did not rely on the report in testifying that the jars 
contained an illegal substance. He relied only on his own belief. 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury'2 verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
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took Brown into the bedroom and allegedly hit Brown in the face 
knocking out a tooth. (R. 765-68; 870-72.) 
Later that evening, Kiriluk, Damon, Rebecca, Chablis and 
Brown left the apartment in a truck, and drove toward Riverton. 
(R. 735; 770; 872-74.) When they came to a stoplight, Kiriluk 
told Rebecca to turn right toward town. (R. 772.) Damon told 
Rebecca to turn left toward the hills. (R. 772; 833. ) 3 
Rebecca turned left, heading away from town toward a water 
treatment plant. (R. 772-74; 875-76.) Chablis testified that when 
they stopped, the men got out of the truck and walked into the 
distance. (R. 776.) Chablis called out to them and someone came 
back and took a knife from her, then walked out of sight. (R. 
777-79.) Although Chablis testified she could not identify the 
person who took the knife (R. 777-79; 817; 819), at one point she 
stated it was Kiriluk. (R. 782.) 
Chablis acknowledged she originally told police that Damon 
took the knife from her. (R. 820.) She stated Kiriluk stayed at 
the truck and did not leave her sight, while Damon and Brown 
walked away toward the tree. (R. 825-26.) 
Rebecca testified that Kiriluk took the knife from her 
purse. (R. 879-81.) He then disappeared with Brown and Damon in 
the distance. (R. 881.) 
Damon returned to the truck without Brown. Kiriluk either 
returned to the truck with Damon or was already there. He handed 
3
 According to Rebecca, Kiriluk instructed her to drive into 
the hills. (R. 875.) 
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Brown's hat to Chablis and asked for a T-shirt. (R. 780-81.) 
Rebecca, Damon, Chablis and Kiriluk got into the cab of the 
truck and drove a short distance, then Kiriluk and Damon got out 
of the cab and climbed into the truck bed for the ride to 
Kiriluk's apartment. (R. 780.) In the truck, Chablis felt a 
sticky knife below the front seat, and noticed a tree branch that 
Kiriluk may have been sitting on. (R. 781-82; 786-87; 885.) 
Chablis took the branch into Kiriluk's apartment. (R. 787.) 
At the apartment Kiriluk handed Rebecca's clean knife to her 
and he disclosed the contents in the hat: Brown's rings, address 
book and wallet. (R. 782-84; 886-90.) According to Chablis, 
Kiriluk took the contents outside to burn them (R. 890), while 
Damon and Rebecca stayed in the bedroom with Chablis. Chablis 
observed Damon talking quietly to Rebecca, and using hand 
movements, including a slicing motion "across his throat." (R. 
784.) Kiriluk returned to the apartment and told Chablis and 
Rebecca to finish burning the items. (R.785-86; 890-91.) 
According to Rebecca, Kiriluk told the others that if any-
body asked about Brown, they should respond that they dropped him 
off at a Denny's Restaurant on 35th South. (R. 891.)4 Rebecca 
4
 Carr testified that during Kiriluk's interrogation, Kiriluk 
stated that on the night of Brown's murder, Kiriluk dropped Brown 
off in the area of a Denny's Restaurant at 9400 South and 7th East 
to meet a gentleman, and that Kiriluk did not see Brown after that. 
(R. 1008.) Carr testified that during a second interview, Kiriluk 
stated he and the others left Brown with "two Mexicans in a Ford 
Aspire," while Rebecca, Chablis, Damon and Kiriluk went to the 
Denny's Restaurant at 4500 South. (R. 1010.) The Mexicans met 
Kiriluk and the others at the restaurant, threw the tree branch on 
the table and said "It's done." (R. 1013.) Finally, Carr stated 
(continued...) 
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also testified that Damon told her the following: 
A. [Rebecca:] [Damon] told me that he asked Mike [Brown] if 
he believed in God, and Mike said yes. And he told him to 
get on his knees and pray, then he hit him. 
Q. [Prosecutor:] Who hit him? 
A. John [Kiriluk] slashed his throat and then stabbed him 
in one side and it came out the other. 
Q. John slashed his throat? 
A. That's what Damon told me. 
Q, What did Damon say he did? 
A. He said that he hit him -- that "I hit Thumper." 
(R. 931; see also 1015.) 
The state charged Rebecca, Damon, and Kiriluk with murder. 
Rebecca gave an initial statement to officers that did not 
inculpate Kiriluk. (R. 909.) After she gave a second statement to 
the state implicating Kiriluk, in exchange for her testimony the 
state promised it would reduce charges against her and recommend 
that she serve no additional time for her crimes. (R. 898-900; 
916; 922; State's Exhibit 6.) 
When Damon was arrested on April 4th, officers seized items 
from his apartment including a T-shirt that he wore two weeks 
earlier on the night of the murder. (R. 913; 1003-04.) During 
pretrial discovery, the defense made specific requests for 
scientific evidence including test results on Damon's T-shirt. 
(R. 43-45; 133-37.) The state provided no such information to 
the defense. (See R. 69-70; 1019.) 
4(...continued) 
Kiriluk told him they all drove into the hills toward the water 
treatment plant, Damon got out of the truck with Brown, they went 
for a walk, and Damon came back alone, tossed the branch into the 
truck, and said "It's done." (R. 1014.) That is consistent with 
Chablis's statement that Damon and Brown walked into the distance. 
When Damon returned he said, "It's done." (R. 780; 825-26.) 
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During trial, Carr testified that serology tests were 
performed on the T-shirt and reflected no sign of blood on the 
shirt. (R. 1004.) In light of the state withholding such 
information from the defense, counsel for Kiriluk objected and 
moved for a mistrial, which was denied. (R. 1017-23.) 
The evidence reflected that Brown suffered a blow to the 
head apparently from a rock, and he was slashed and stabbed in 
the throat, causing his death. (R. 1064-76; 1079.) Because the 
medical examiner did not examine Rebecca's knife, he was unable 
to testify with respect to whether the knife caused the injuries. 
(R. 1080-82.) According to the examiner, if the knife caused the 
injuries and was placed back in its sheath, there would be blood 
on both objects. (R. 1082-83.) State experts found no 
indications of blood on the knife or sheath. (R. 1050.) 
The state's latent print examiner testified that a finger-
print on the knife belonged to Kiriluk. (R. 1094-95; 1105-06.) 
However, the configuration of the print was inconsistent with 
handling the knife while stabbing someone. (R. 1108.) The exa-
miner could not identify other prints on the knife. (R. 1106-07.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During interrogation concerning Brown's murder, Kiriluk un-
equivocally invoked his rights per Miranda. He informed Carr that 
keeping his rights in mind he did not want to make a statement. 
Carr continued interrogation in violation of the invocation and 
testified that Kiriluk subsequently provided different accounts 
of circumstances surrounding Brown's death and admitted to 
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threatening Brown, among other things. Those statements should 
have been suppressed. (Point I, infra.) 
In addition, after Kiriluk invoked his rights to counsel and 
silence, Carr and Winters obtained consent to search the 
apartment. The consent was the product of coercion in that it was 
obtained in violation of Miranda, and it was obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality. State witnesses testified to 
items found during the illegal search that support motive. Such 
evidence should have been suppressed. (Point II, infra.) 
Winters testified that jars found in Kiriluk's room con-
tained a precursor to meth, supporting motive; Carr testified 
that tests performed on Damon's clothing showed no blood there, 
supporting the determination that Kiriluk stabbed Brown. The evi-
dence was presented in violation of the state's duty to provide 
continuing discovery, and inadmissible under Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
at 388. The state failed to prove (1) the inherent reliability of 
underlying techniques used to determine the conclusions; (2) 
proper application of the techniques; and (3) that the evidence 
was more probative than prejudicial. (Points III and IV, infra.) 
The court failed to strike the state's hearsay testimony 
that Kiriluk stabbed Brown, and it failed to provide a curative 
instruction. The hearsay evidence was inadmissible under Utah R. 
Evid. 802 and the confrontation provisions of the state and 
federal constitutions. (Point V, infra.) 
The errors alone and together should undermine this Court's 
confidence that a fair trial was had. The cumulative error 
doctrine compels reversal of this matter. (Point VI, infra.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. OFFICERS INTERROGATED KIRILUK IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
RIGHTS PER MIRANDA. 
A. OFFICERS WERE REQUIRED TO CEASE QUESTIONING ONCE KIRILUK 
INVOKED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
Statements made by a defendant in response to custodial 
interrogation are not admissible unless defendant is told of his 
rights per Miranda, and he "knowingly and intelligently waive[s] 
these rights and agree[s] to answer questions or make a state-
ment." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Where a defendant invokes his 
Miranda rights, those rights must be "scrupulously honored." Id. 
The state has a "heavy burden" in proving that a defendant waived 
Miranda rights. See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (1990) (cites omitted). 
In Davis v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994), the United States 
Supreme Court reiterated that after a defendant has made a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, law 
enforcement officers may continue questioning unless defendant 
invokes his rights. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel 
requires "some statement that can reasonably be construed to be 
an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." 
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (cites omitted); see also Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (statement that defendant "want[ed] 
an attorney before making a deal" was sufficient to warrant 
termination of interrogation); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 
U.S. 91 (1984) (defendant's statement, "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do 
that," in response to officer advice that defendant could have 
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attorney present during questioning constituted invocation of 
Miranda rights requiring cessation of questioning); State v. 
Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1993) ("Edwards dealt with a clear, 
unequivocal request for counsel"), disavowed on other grounds. 
State v. Mirauet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). 
[Once a defendant indicates] in any manner, at any time 
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain 
silent, the interrogation must cease.[] At this point he has 
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes this 
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, 
subtle or otherwise. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. 
In this case, during interrogation Kiriluk invoked his right 
to remain silent and to an attorney. Relevant portions of the 
interrogation reflect the following: 
Q. [Carr:] [R]ight now we've been keepin[g] within the scope 
of [Brown's] murder. Okay ... [W]e're gonna change gears 
here ... I want ya to remember that the tape is going, okay? 
I want you to remember those rights that we talked about 
earlier. Do you remember those? 
A. [Kiriluk:] Uh huh. (affirmative) 
Q. [Carr:] Okay. [B]ack at the apartment [drugs have been] 
found, okay? Also at the apartment, while they were there, 
people came up and were startin[g] to make buys, ... while 
[] my Sergeant and some other [], cops were there. Okay? Now 
this happened inside your apartment. You're going to be 
arrested for that, okay? Now, [do] you want [to] make any 
statements in regard to that. [Kleepincr in mind everything 
about you do have the right to remain silent. You do have 
the right to have an attorney, things of that nature. 
* * * 
Q. [Carr:] I'm not gonna bullshit ya here. That's what the 
call was about, okay? The Sergeant said while they were 
there they've arrested four people there. Four people that 
have come up there, tried to make buys, someone came up with 
a bottle of pills, things of that nature, okay? But appa-
rently there was some dope found actually at your apartment. 
Okay? Now that in and of itself is enough for possession. 
Bare minimal possession. [That's] not sayin that you're 
dealin, okay? But that's bare minimal possession. Okay? And 
that's, and that's what you'd be lookin at right now, so 
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again, do you want to make any statements in that regard to 
anything that goes, went on in your apartment that has to do 
with the drugs that were found there? 
A. [Kiriluk:] I don't. 
Q. [Carr:] Okay. 
A. [Kiriluk:] Okay. 
(Addendum B at 32-34 (emphasis added).) 
The trial court found that although Kiriluk specifically 
advised Carr that keeping his rights in mind he did not want to 
make a statement (R. 476), Kiriluk7s subsequent answers to Carr's 
continued interrogation reflected a willingness to cooperate. 
The trial court stated the following: 
The context is a context wherein Officer Carr has been paged 
by his Sergeant, Jerry Townsend, and has been informed, and 
so informed Mr. Kiriluk, [that] there [were] four persons 
under arrest at the Kiriluk apartment. 
They were there for drugs. They'd come in and one 
fellow had even put a bottle of pills in the other person's 
pocket, as was testified to by Officer Townsend. And so 
Officer Carr came back to the conversation and told Mr. 
Kiriluk that he was going to be placed under arrest for what 
was going on at his home. 
And then in the context of what was asked of him, he 
asked him again, on the top of page 34 -- well, I have read 
it all before into the record so I will only read the last 
sentence. He says, "And that's it. And that's what you're 
looking at right now. So again, do you want to make any 
statements in that regard?" 
I view "in that regard" to refer to in regard to what's 
going on at his [apartment] at that time. "To anything that 
goes or went on in your apartment." In fact, there was 
further evidence of that context. And then he continues, 
"That has to do with [the] drugs that were found there." 
So all he's talking about is, "Do you have any comments 
to make as to what's going on in your apartment right now?" 
And he says, "I don't." And the remainder or the context 
then indicates that he's more than willing to respond. 
(R. 476-77.) That portion of the record containing the trial 
court's findings is attached as Addendum C ("Addendum C"). 
The court's findings are in error. The court improperly 
looked to additional statements to determine that Kiriluk was 
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"more than willing to respond." (R. 477.) While additional 
statements may clarify "waiver," they cannot "be used to cast 
retrospective doubt" on the invocation itself. Smith, 469 U.S. at 
100. 
The courts below were able to construe Smith's request for 
counsel as "ambiguous" only by looking to Smith's subsequent 
responses to continued police questioning and by concluding 
that, "considered in total," Smith's "statements" were equi-
vocal. This line of analysis is unprecedented and untenable 
.... Where nothing about the request for counsel or circum-
stances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, 
all questioning must cease. In these circumstances, an 
accused's subsequent statements are relevant only to the 
question whether the accused waived the right he had invoked. 
Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and 
the two must not be blurred by merging them together. 
Id. at 97-98 (cites omitted); see also State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 
265 (Tenn. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992) (defendant 
told police he had nothing to say. Police gave additional warn-
ings, took him to crime scene, and questioned him further. Police 
failed to scrupulously honor invocation); People v. Kleber, 859 
P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo. 1993); People v. St.Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61, 
67-68 (111. 1988); Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 
1989),. cert, denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Christopher v. Fla., 
824 F.2d 836, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 
1077 (1988); Smith v. U.S., 529 A.2d 312, 315-17 (App. D.C. 
1987). 
The officers were required to cease their interrogation once 
Kiriluk expressed his intent to invoke his Miranda rights. 
Statements obtained thereafter could be nothing other than the 
product of compulsion. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see Mayes v. 
State, 571 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ark. 1978); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
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374 N.E.2d 81 (Mass. 1978); U.S. v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 
1368 (5th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th 
Cir. 1975) .5 
After Kiriluk invoked his rights as set forth above, Carr 
issued yet another set of Miranda warnings 45 minutes later, 
produced the tree branch, and initiated a second interrogation. 
Carr testified at trial that during the second interview, Kiriluk 
was visibly shaken when the tree branch was produced, and he 
provided two different accounts of the circumstances prior to 
Brown's death. (See R. 1010-15.) 
Pursuant to Miranda law, where a defendant has invoked the 
right to remain silent, police are required to honor that 
assertion. Police may obtain a subsequent waiver only if they 
have honored the original assertion and, after a "significant 
period of time" has elapsed, they have provided fresh warnings. 
See Michigan v. Moselv, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975); Olof, 527 
F.2d at 753. 
Fresh warnings and a subsequent waiver are not sufficient, 
however, when defendant also has invoked the right to an attor-
5
 Courts attach no significance to the fact that an officer 
questioning the suspect did not know that the suspect invoked 
Miranda rights. "In addition to the fact that Edwards focuses on 
the state of mind of the suspect and of the police, custodial 
interrogation must be conducted pursuant to established procedures, 
and those procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to 
initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has pre-
viously requested counsel." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687 
(1988) . Thus, Winters is charged with knowing that Kiriluk invoked 
his rights per Miranda; it was improper for Winters to question 
Kiriluk or request consent to search. See Point II, infra. 
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ney. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (when accused has invoked the 
right to counsel, a valid waiver cannot be established by showing 
that he responded to further police-initiated interrogation. " [An 
accused] is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him"). Thus, 
statements and reactions obtained by Carr after Kiriluk invoked 
his Miranda rights should have been suppressed. Carr was 
prohibited from continued interrogation without first providing 
Kiriluk with an opportunity to have an attorney present. 
B. THE ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
In considering harmful error in the wake of a constitutional 
violation, this Court has stated: 
[W]e examine both the amount of evidence indicating guilt as 
well as the nature of the State's case and of the defen-
dant's defense. For instance, we may consider: (1) whether 
the State's case is based on circumstantial rather than 
direct evidence; (2) the plausibility of any exculpatory 
explanation for the set of circumstances leading to the 
charges; (3) whether the case depends primarily on the reso-
lution of conflicting evidence consisting of uncorroborated 
and conflicting testimonies; and (4) the extent to which the 
defense rested on the defendant's credibility. 
State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997) (viola-
tion under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)); see also State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court 
likewise has stated: 
A number of factors determine whether an error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt including 
"the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecu-
tion's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contra-
dicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the 
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of 
course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." 
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State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (quoting 
State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987)). 
Here, Carr testified to statements made after Kiriluk 
invoked his rights: Carr showed the tree branch to Kiriluk and a 
"visible change came over him." (R. 1009.) Also, Carr testified 
that during the second interview, Kiriluk provided Carr with 
different accounts of the event. See note 4, supra; (R. 1011-
016). Carr also testified that Kiriluk admitted he threatened 
Brown over missing precursor. (R. 1011.) Those inadmissible 
statements were important to the prosecution's case. 
With regard to the considerations set forth in Morrison and 
Villarreal, the state's case was based on circumstantial 
evidence. The inferences that can be drawn from the 
circumstantial evidence do not support each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Chablis testified 
that she was with Brown and others prior to Brown's death, she 
also admitted that she was not truthful with police during two 
interviews concerning the matter. (R. 790.) Chablis's credibility 
was in issue. She provided two separate accounts of the event, 
one of which exculpated Kiriluk. She testified that she 
originally told police Kiriluk was with her by the truck when 
Brown and Damon went down to the tree; Kiriluk was not involved 
in the murder. (R. 825-26.) The jury was required to resolve 
issues of credibility and inconsistency in considering 
circumstantial evidence presented through Chablis. 
The only other witness to testify to the event was Rebecca. 
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She admitted she lied to police. After she changed her version 
of the events specifically to implicate Kiriluk and agreed to 
testify, the state promised to reduce charges against her and 
recommend that she not serve any additional time for her crimes. 
(R. 913-919; 921-922.) She admitted she was doing everything she 
could to stay out of prison or jail. (R. 915-23.) Her credibility 
was in issue. As this Court is aware, a codefendant who is 
promised favorable treatment may be treated with suspicion. See 
State v. Ross, 333 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 20 (Utah App. 1997) (plea 
agreement is relevant in assessing credibility, motive, bias for 
testifying); see also Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (a 
codefendant's "credibility is inevitably suspect"). 
Jolynn Penrod testified that Kiriluk had also been angry 
with Brown, but on the day of the murder Kiriluk and Brown were 
friends, and Brown appeared safe and happy with Kiriluk. (R. 73 0-
32; 748; 750.) Additional state witnesses were unable to testify 
that a knife with Kiriluk's fingerprint on it was used as the 
murder weapon (R. 1080), or that Kiriluk used the weapon. (R. 
1108.) The state did not present cumulative evidence. Rather, 
its case hinged entirely on contradictory, questionable evidence, 
where the jury was required to weigh credibility issues. Evidence 
is not so overwhelming when it rests on the jury's resolution of 
conflicts and credibility issues.6 
6
 Under Morrison, this Court also may consider "the plausi-
bility of any exculpatory explanation for the set of circumstances 
leading to the charges." Kiriluk's earlier statements to Carr 
support an exculpatory explanation: Kiriluk told Carr during the 
(continued...) 
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Given the credibility issues, this Court cannot conclude 
there was overwhelming evidence against Kiriluk. Where evidence 
linking Kiriluk to the crime was circumstantial, the trial 
court's failure to suppress Kiriluk's statements was prejudicial. 
POINT II. THE CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS PER SE COERCIVE 
SINCE IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA. 
In considering searches and seizures in the home, this Court 
stated: "The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, which 
is imposed on agents of the government who seek to enter a home 
for purposes of search or arrest, is the 'principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings.'" State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah App. 1988) (cites omitted). 
Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid warrant to 
search a home, under both federal and state constitutional pro-
visions the search is per se unreasonable -- "subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 
Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (warrantless search inside home is 
presumptively unreasonable); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992); State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) 
(warrantless search is per se unreasonable under art. I, § 14). 
The state must demonstrate "that the circumstances of the 
seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement." 
6(...continued) 
interrogation that Brown was fearful of the Mexican mafia, who may 
have been involved in the murder. Rebecca's original statement to 
police that they dropped Brown off at a restaurant on the night of 
the murder apparently to meet with such persons supports that 
explanation. (R. 892.) 
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State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992); see also 
State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court in this matter found that the search was 
lawful based on "consent." A search following consent is valid 
only if the state proves that "(1) the consent was voluntarily 
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality." State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 
1037, 1040, (Utah App. 1993), afffd 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); 
see also State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688-89 (Utah 1990) . 
In considering the totality of the circumstances in this 
case, Kiriluk's "consent" was involuntary and the product of 
police coercion. See Point I.A., supra. The trial court's 
findings are clearly in error. Where consent is obtained through 
coercion, the state may not use evidence from the search in its 
case against defendant. State v. Johnson, 576 A.2d 834, 846-47 
(N.J. 1990) (court found that confession was illegally obtained, 
therefore subsequent consent to search was invalid); U.S. v. 
Taft, 769 F.Supp. 1295, 1304 (D.Vermont 1991) ("The rational of 
Edwards supports the conclusion that failure to honor defendants' 
request for counsel in and of itself creates a coercive 
situation" invalidating subsequent consent to search). 
A. THE FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS SINCE THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS THE DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT WAS COERCED. 
"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 
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1997) (quoting State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1991)); 
accord State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App.1989). 
The facts surrounding consent in this case are set forth in 
Point I.A., supra. To reiterate, the court found that Kiriluk 
initially advised Carr that he did not want to make a statement 
or cooperate with officers with respect to what was going on in 
the apartment and drugs. (Addendum C at 476-77.) The court ruled 
that notwithstanding Kiriluk's clear statement, Carr's continued 
interrogation and Kiriluk's answers reflected a willingness to 
cooperate. (Addendum C at 476-77.) 
The trial court disregarded that Winters' and Carr's request 
for "consent" was a mirror image of the earlier interrogation 
wherein Kiriluk specifically asserted that in light of his rights 
he would not cooperate. The transcript of the interrogation 
reflects that Kiriluk invoked his rights as follows: 
[Carr:] ... You're going to be arrested for [drugs found in 
the apartment,] okay? Now, [do] you want [to] make any 
statements in regard to that. [K]eepincr in wind everything 
about vou do have the right to remain silent. You do have 
the right to have an attorney, things of that nature. 
* * * 
[T]hat's what you'd be lookin at right now, so again, do you 
want to make any statements in that regard to anything that 
goes, went on in your apartment that has to do with the 
drugs that were found there? 
[Kiriluk:] I don't. 
[Carr:] Okay. 
[Kiriluk:] Okay. 
(Addendum B at 33-34 (emphasis added).) Keeping his rights in 
mind, Kiriluk specifically, unequivocally stated he did not want 
to cooperate with regard to what was going on in the apartment. 
The officers were required to cease interrogation 
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specifically with regard to that subject matter. Statements 
obtained after Kiriluk invoked his rights could not be other than 
the product of compulsion. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. 
After Kiriluk stated that he did not want to cooperate, Carr 
then stated the following during the interrogation: 
[Carr:] After another approximate three to four minute delay 
this will restart the interview. [T]hat was a page from 
Deputy Winters, with the Sheriff's Office Narcotics Unit. 
[Winters] wished to speak with John in regards to the 
narcotics that were found [at] John and [Jolynn's] 
apartment. John did you talk to Deputy Winters on the phone? 
(Addendum B at 3 7.) Winters inquired about the very subject 
matter upon which Kiriluk earlier invoked his rights. 
As set forth at Point I.A., supra, the trial court 
improperly looked to those additional statements to determine 
that Kiriluk was "more than willing to respond." See Smith, 469 
U.S. at 97. Based on that improper determination the trial court 
found that consent was voluntary: 
[W] as a later consent given voluntarily[?] [T]he answer to 
that is clearly yes. The context of the discussion shows 
that. Deputy Winters testified to that. And then Mr. 
Kiriluk, on the record, reaffirmed the voluntariness of his 
consent in the recorded conversation with Deputy Carr. 
(Addendum C at 479.) The consent was obtained in violation of 
Miranda and the constitution; it was per se coercive. Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 479. The court's findings are in error. 
Kiriluk relies on Miranda case law to support the factual 
determination that statements made post-invocation concerning (1) 
the apartment, (2) what was going on there, and (3) drugs found 
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there, were per se coercive in violation of Miranda.7 
To be clear, Kiriluk is not seeking a remedy under Miranda 
law for the violation identified in this Point II. Kiriluk7s 
remedy is under the Fourth Amendment and its Utah counterpart. 
Where the record reflects consent was invalid under Miranda, the 
search was unconstitutional. See Johnson, 576 A.2d at 846-47; 
Taft, 769 F.Supp. at 1304; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 228 (1973); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688-89; State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
B. THE OFFICERS' REQUEST FOR CONSENT WAS ALSO AN 
EXPLOITATION OF A PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
The consent was also invalid in that it was an exploitation 
of a prior illegality. "[E]ven if we were to assume defendant's 
subsequent 'consent' to search was voluntary, [] it is still 
necessary to determine whether the consent was obtained as a 
7
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 
(1974), ruled that Miranda law may not provide a remedy when non-
testimonial statements are obtained in violation of the procedural 
safeguards articulated in Miranda. In Tucker, defendant was not 
given full Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, officers conducted 
interrogation. During questioning, defendant identified an alibi 
witness who served to discredit defendant's story and bolster the 
state's case. The Supreme Court determined Miranda was violated 
but defendant did not have a remedy under the exclusionary rule 
since the statements were non-testimonial. Id. at 451; see also 
Oregon v. Els tad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (under Miranda law, 
earlier interrogation without warnings did not invalidate later 
statements made after officers provided proper warnings). 
Tucker is both applicable and distinguishable from this case. 
As in Tucker, Kiriluk's later statement (consent in this instance) 
was obtained in violation of Miranda law. Id. at 445-46. However, 
the defendant in Tucker did not have the 4th Amendment overlay. 
Thus, where the defendant in Tucker had no remedy under Miranda 
law, Kiriluk has a specific remedy under the 4th Amendment: Con-
sent to search under the 4th Amendment is invalid if it is obtained 
by use of coercion. Kiriluk is not seeking suppression under 
Miranda law here. He is seeking a remedy under the 4th Amendment. 
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result of the agent [s'] exploitation of their antecedent 
illegality." State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 440 (UtahApp. 1996). 
"When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent 
after an illegal police action ... the prosecution 'has a much 
heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search7 
which does not follow police misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
687-88 (quoting U.S. v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). The Utah Supreme Court has established facts that a 
reviewing court must examine in determining whether consent was 
attenuated from a prior police illegality: 
[T]he exploitation analysis requires a balancing of the 
relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time 
and circumstances that intervene before the consent is 
given. The nature and degree of the illegality will usually 
be inversely related to the effectiveness of time and 
intervening events to dissipate the presumed taint. Where 
the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean break in 
the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent 
to find the consent valid. For example, Justice Powell in 
Brown suggested that, where it appears from the facts that 
the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a 
confession, an intervening consultation with counsel or 
presentation before a magistrate may be required before the 
taint can be removed. 422 U.S. at 611, 95 S.Ct. at 2265-66 
(Powell, J., concurring). The same type of break should be 
required where the evidence shows that the police purposely 
engaged in conduct to induce a consent. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Utah 1993). Also, 
The basis for the second part of the two-part analysis is 
found in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 
441 (1963), which stated that a trial court must determine 
in such a case "'whether, granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection 
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality 
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.' " 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 
at 417 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). The 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to 
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are 
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nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police illegality. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690; see also Sims v. Collection Div., 841 
P.2d 6 (Utah 1992) (consent following prior illegal seizure was 
not sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegality to purge 
taint). The following factors are relevant in considering 
exploitation: (1) temporal proximity; (2) presence or absence of 
intervening circumstances; (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 
(1975); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (recognizing Brown 
factors); and Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (directing courts to 
apply factors). 
(1) Temporal proximity. Police misconduct existed where 
officers failed to scrupulously honor the unequivocal invocation 
of Kiriluk's rights to silence and counsel, and per Miranda. 
Within "three to four minutes" after Kiriluk invoked his rights 
(Addendum B at 37), Carr assisted Winters in obtaining consent. 
The request to search came on the heels of Kiriluk's invocation 
of his constitutional rights as they related to events going on 
at the apartment. "The record shows that a very short period had 
expired," Ham, 910 P.2d at 441, between the invocation of rights 
as they related to events at the apartment, and the request for 
consent. 
(2) Presence or absence of intervening circumstances. In 
this matter, there were no intervening circumstances. Under 
Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-07, where Kiriluk invoked the right to 
remain silent the officers were required to honor the assertion 
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and to provide Kiriluk with fresh warnings as an intervening 
event before initiating later interrogation on the specific 
subject matter; and under Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, where 
Kiriluk invoked the right to counsel the officers were required 
to provide Kiriluk with the opportunity to consult an attorney as 
an intervening event. The absence of appropriate intervening 
circumstances invalidates the consent. 
(3) The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 
This case is an example of flagrant police misconduct. Officers 
were seeking evidence of drugs in the apartment. (R. 439.) 
Moments before seeking consent to search, Kiriluk specifically 
invoked his right to remain silent with respect to what was going 
on in the apartment and drugs found there. Notwithstanding, Carr 
and Winters sought and obtained permission to search when they 
were required to scrupulously honor Kiriluk7s request. 
C. THE 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL HARM. 
In this matter, illegally obtaining consent to search the 
apartment resulted in prejudicial harm. The state witnesses 
testified with respect to items seized during the search, 
including a notebook allegedly containing a recipe for metham-
phetamine (R. 853-54; State's Exhibit 5) and jars containing 
precursor. (R. 941; 955); see also Point III. The state used the 
items to establish motive for the crime. Although motive is not 
an element of murder, the state sought to use the evidence to 
present a basis for the commission of the offense, where it was 
otherwise illogical that Kiriluk might be involved. Indeed, the 
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prosecutor repeatedly pointed out to the jury during opening and 
closing arguments the importance of the "motive" evidence; he 
identified it as the "Tcey" to the case. (See R. 1162-63; see also 
R. 691-94; 1121-25; 1130; 1132; 1134; 1165; 1170.) 
In assessing the considerations identified in Villarreal 
(see Point I.B., supra), the state's evidence concerning the 
elements of the offense was circumstantial, while the notebook 
and "precursor" constituted direct evidence going to motive. The 
items seized during the unlawful search were important -- indeed 
they were key --to the prosecution's case. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 
at 425-26; see also Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297. 
With regard to other considerations set forth in Morrison 
and Villarreal, as set forth in Point I.B., supra, the state's 
case was based on circumstantial evidence.8 
With regard to whether Winters' testimony was "cumulative," 
Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425, Chablis, Rebecca and Jolynn all 
testified to a relationship between Kiriluk and Brown involving 
precursor. (R. 730-31; 759-61; 863-66.) However, closer review 
of each witness's testimony reflects weaknesses. Specifically, 
Chablis admitted she failed to tell the truth to police, placing 
her credibility in issue. She also testified that she initially 
told police Kiriluk was not involved in the murder. Chablis's 
8
 Under Morrison, this Court also may consider "the plausi-
bility of any exculpatory explanation for the set of circumstances 
leading to the charges." Here the exculpatory explanation is that 
Kiriluk did not accompany Damon and Brown to the tree when Damon 
murdered Brown. Without motive evidence, there was no reason for 
Kiriluk to accompany Damon and Brown. Chablis originally told 
police Kiriluk did not go with the men to the tree. (R. 847-48.) 
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initial statements support Kiriluk's lack of involvement in the 
offense. See note 8, supra. 
Rebecca admitted she lied to police. After she changed her 
statement to implicate Kiriluk, in exchange for her testimony the 
state promised to reduce charges against her and to recommend 
that she receive no additional time for her crimes. Rebecca's 
testimony presented credibility issues and was contradictory. (R. 
913-19; 921-22.) 
Jolynn testified that weeks before the murder, Kiriluk was 
angry with Brown for "ripping off" the precursor. Jolynn did not 
provide motive evidence for the day of the murder. In fact Jolynn 
testified that on the day of Brown's murder, she perceived Brown 
and Kiriluk to be friendly and happy. (R. 730-32; 748; 750.) 
With regard to the "overall strength of the prosecution's 
case," Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426, while additional evidence 
reflected that Kiriluk allegedly may have been involved in 
destroying evidence (R. 890), or associating with Rebecca and 
Damon weeks earlier for the purpose of having them "intimidate" 
Brown (R. 866), the state never charged Kiriluk with tampering 
and it never established that Kiriluk associated with Rebecca or 
Damon in order to obtain their assistance in murdering Brown. 
Evidence linking Kiriluk to the crime was circumstantial, 
conflicting and presented credibility issues. The court's failure 
to suppress items found during the search was prejudicial. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING WINTERS TO 
TESTIFY THAT PICKLE JARS CONTAINED AN ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE. 
A. THE STATE PRESENTED SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF 
RIMMASCH. 
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The state introduced the theory at trial that Kiriluk 
allegedly murdered Brown over the whereabouts of a precursor used 
to manufacture methamphetamine. (R. 565.) To establish Kiriluk's 
involvement with methamphetamine, the state presented conclusive 
evidence through Winters that liquid found in jars in Kiriluk's 
room constituted precursor. Winters was the only person to 
testify that precursor (or any paraphernalia for that matter) was 
found at Kiriluk's apartment. (See trial R. in general; and 955.) 
Winters' testimony focused on identifying the liquid as 
precursor. The testimony should have been prohibited for two 
reasons: Winters was only able to testify to such a matter as a 
result of the illegal search, see Point II, supra, and the 
testimony lacked foundation. 
Identifying the direct properties of a liquid as an illegal 
substance constitutes science. See David L. Faigman, David H. 
Kaye, Michael J. Saks, and Joseph Sanders, 2 Modern Scientific 
Evidence §33-2.7 (1997). "[Science] represents a process for 
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world 
that are subject to further testing and refinement." Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) . 
Pursuant to Utah law, scientific evidence is admissible 
under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 
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(Utah 1989), and State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), 
determined the standard by which the admissibility of scientific 
evidence is to be judged. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642. Under Utah 
law, the proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing 
its admissibility. Thus, in this case, the state was required to 
prove that (1) underlying principles and techniques used in 
identifying the liquid as a precursor were inherently reliable; 
(2) the principles were properly applied in this case; and (3) 
"the proffered scientific evidence [would] be more probative than 
prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. 
In practice, the foundational showing necessary to demon-
strate the inherent reliability of a scientific principle or 
technique discussed in step one will overlap with the foun-
dational showing'necessary for the admission of scientific 
evidence in a particular case discussed in step two. We 
separate them, however, to emphasize the point that a 
foundational showing that a technique is inherently reliable 
does not necessarily imply that the technique was properly 
applied to the facts of the case by a qualified expert. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 n.2; see also Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 406. 
[The "foundational showing" underlying scientific evidence] 
must explore with careful precision such questions as the 
correctness of the scientific principles underlying the 
testimony, the accuracy and reliability of the techniques 
utilized in applying the principles to the subject matter 
before the court and in reaching the conclusion expressed in 
the opinion, and the qualifications of those actually 
gathering the data and analyzing it. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403. 
Considering the factors in Crosby, the trial court was re-
quired first to determine whether the state sufficiently estab-
lished the inherent reliability of the underlying principles and 
techniques supporting the determination that the liquid was 
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precursor. Here Winters' specific conclusions were based on his 
12 months' experience in the narcotics unit (R. 435; 937; 955), 
his observations, and various narcotics courses, including 
training with clandestine lab operations. (Id.; 442.) 
There was no evidence before the court that Winters' obser-
vations were consistent with techniques accepted in scientific or 
legal circles, that the liquid was unique so as to make the ob-
servations reliable, or that Winters was reliable in conclusively 
identifying a liquid as a specific illegal substance. The prose-
cutor asked Winters if he was familiar with preop, a precursor to 
methamphetamine, and whether Winters found preop in Kiriluk's 
bedroom. Winters answered in the affirmative. (R. 941; 955.) 
On cross-examination, Winters testified with respect to an 
inconclusive field test that he conducted on the substance. (R. 
952-55.) Even if inconclusive testing supported the determination 
that the liquid was a precursor, the state failed to establish 
the reliability of such testing. That is, if the state had proof 
that Winters' observations and/or inconclusive tests were 
sufficient to prove that a liquid specifically constituted 
precursor, it should have presented the information to the court 
in order that the court could assess under Rimmasch whether 
principles at issue were reliable. 
[The] court must determine whether the party seeking to have 
the evidence admitted has sufficiently demonstrated the 
inherent reliability of the underlying principles and 
techniques. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. 
Utah statutory law identifies acceptable methods for 
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determining the scientific properties of a matter and whether 
such matter is an illegal substance. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-21(4) (1996), the Department of Public Safety is required 
to establish standards for interpreting chemical/forensic 
analyses to determine whether a substance is a precursor. 
In other contexts, methods for identifying an illegal 
substance are specifically outlined. For example, the Utah Drug 
and Alcohol Testing Act for employers requires that drug testing 
"shall conform to scientifically accepted analytical methods and 
procedures. Testing shall include verification or confirmation 
of any positive test result by gas chromatography, gas 
chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable 
analytical method." Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-6(5) (1997); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993) (standards for determining 
presence of alcohol/drug in person's system; test results are 
admissible if testing was in accord with standards and source of 
information from which the results were made and methods used 
indicated trustworthiness); Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-36(3) (1996) 
(outlining acceptable procedures .for drug testing government 
employees); see Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 
1987) (test result inadmissible for lack of foundation). 
Winters' observations of the liquid (which lacked apparent 
unique attributes) constituted the underlying principles used to 
determine the scientific properties of the substance. The state 
presented no evidence concerning Winters' reliability in obser-
ving and identifying such a specific substance. The state failed 
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to establish the first factor in Crosby. 
The second factor concerns whether the state's evidence 
supported the determination that principles used in this case for 
identifying the liquid were properly applied. Without evidence 
that Winters' observations are reliable, there is no basis for 
determining whether application of the technique was proper. 
In essence, the trial court accepted Winters' testimony 
based on the proposition that a narcotics officer, who has 
received training with respect to clandestine lab operations, is 
capable of determining with a high degree of reliability the 
specific properties of a liquid in order to conclusively identify 
it as an illegal substance. (R. 941; 955.) Such a foundation for 
the evidence was inappropriate. 
Although drug testing has achieved widespread acceptance as 
reliable, the state failed to present evidence to support the de-
termination that acceptable testing was performed here and that 
such testing supported Winters' conclusions. See State v. Miller, 
740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1987) . The state failed to present evidence that Winters 
complied with established standards in administering a chemical 
analysis to determine the properties of the liquid, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-21(4) (1996), or observed unique characteristics 
allowing him to make the conclusive identification. 
Other states have identified acceptable methods for deter-
mining that a substance is an illegal drug; failure to adhere to 
methods will render evidence inadmissible or insufficient. See 
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Beaslev v. State, 665 P.2d 852, 853 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) 
(state's witnesses may have been competent to provide adequate 
basis for testifying with regard to properties of substance. 
"Regrettably, no such testimony was elicited"); State v. Hun-
dley, 895 P.2d 403, 404 (Wash. 1995); State v. Mitchell, 937 P.2d 
960, 962 (Idaho App. 1997); State v. Northrup, 825 P.2d 174, 178-
82 (Kan. App. 1992) (states accept officer testimony as cir-
cumstantial evidence). Winters did not provide circumstantial 
evidence concerning the substance. His testimony was conclusive, 
effectively constituting unfounded direct evidence. (R. 955.) 
With regard to the third factor set forth in Crosby, the 
state was required to establish that Winters' testimony was more 
probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 
641. Here Winters' testimony was prejudicial. He acknowledged 
his field test flashed inconclusive. Then he testified 
confidently that the liquid constituted precursor. (R. 955.) 
Winters took the jars into custody for testing by the crime 
lab. When he received a toxicology report he apparently gave it 
to the prosecutor. (R. 951.) Neither Winters nor the prosecutor 
disclosed the results of the report at trial. The results were 
not included in the record, and therefore, are not known. 
In addition, Winters did not rely on the toxicology report 
in testifying with respect to the liquid. The state made no 
attempt to place the report in evidence, nor did it call the lab 
technician who prepared the report to testify, notwithstanding 
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the scientific nature of the information. 
Since Winters' test flashed inconclusive, his testimony was 
prejudicial. More probative evidence would have been the results 
of the toxicology report, which was never placed in evidence, or 
testimony from the chemist who prepared the report. 
The careful exploration that needed to be made in this case 
was disregarded in its entirety. "[W]e are convinced that trial 
courts sometimes admit 'scientific' evidence without scrutinizing 
its foundation carefully." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 399. 
The difficulty presented by the record in the instance case 
is that the trial court did not follow the approach dictated 
by rPhillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980),] and the 
State made no real effort to lay a foundation that would 
permit a determination of reliability. 
Id. at 403. "The trial court admitted the evidence over 
objection, apparently on the erroneous assumption [that] the lack 
of foundation went to the weight, not to the admissibility of the 
evidence." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407; (see also R. 566.) "[I]t 
can be said that evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a 
matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is 
inadmissible." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640 (cites omitted). 
B. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the prejudice standard 
under Rimmasch as follows: 
If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
defendant, we must reverse the conviction. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407. In Rimmasch, defendant's daughter, the 
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victim of child sexual abuse, "described [during a trial] the 
alleged incident of sexual activity" for which defendant was 
charged. Id. at 390. In addition, experts for the state 
testified that the daughter had been abused, and some of the 
experts expressed defendant was the culprit. Id. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in allowing 
the expert testimony. Because the case "hinged on a determination 
of credibility," the court found that allowing the evidence 
constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 407. 
The court recognized that erroneous admissions are more 
critical in a jury trial, since the judge in a bench trial is 
likely able to distinguish between substantive and other types of 
evidence (i.e. impeachment, cumulative). The case in Rimmasch was 
tried to the bench. 
Kiriluk's case was tried to a jury. The "precursor" was the 
only direct evidence of motive. See Point II.C, supra. The 
state referred to such evidence as the "key" to the case. (R. 
1162-63.) Additional evidence reflected that Kiriluk was with 
Brown and a group of people on the night of the murder (R. 748; 
750 (Jolynn's testimony); 847-48 (Chablis' testimony); 872-74 
(Rebecca's testimony); 716 (testimony of Brown's step-father), 
and Brown seemed happy and safe with Kiriluk. (R. 748; 750.) 
Chablis and Rebecca admitted they lied to police and gave 
several different accounts of the event, placing their 
credibility in issue. Chablis testified she informed police that 
Kiriluk did not escort Brown to the ravine area but stayed at the 
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truck with her when Damon murdered Brown. Because the evidence 
was in conflict and contradictory the jury likely found the 
inadmissible motive testimony to be key. For the jury the 
evidence may have resolved many of the conflicts and explained 
the basis for the murder. We cannot be sure that the jury did 
not convict Kiriluk on the basis of the motive evidence. This 
Court should reverse and remand this case since evidence was 
admitted in violation of Rimmasch and Crosby. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CARR TO TESTIFY 
TO THE RESULTS OF A SEROLOGY TEST. 
Prior to trial, counsel for Kiriluk repeatedly and 
specifically requested information from the state concerning 
serology/scientific tests performed on a T-shirt that Damon wore 
the night of the murder. (R. 43-45; 133-37.) 
In response to the requests, the state represented that all 
relevant information was provided, never disclosing the results 
of serology testing. (R. 69-70; 1004-05; 1017-20.) At trial the 
state surprised Kiriluk with Carr's statements that serology 
tests were performed and reflected negative for blood on the 
shirt. (R. 1003-004.) Carr's testimony reflected the following: 
A. [Carr:] Well, when we arrested [Damon] he was staying in 
an apartment [in] West Valley. He had several bags, like a 
duffle bag, and a couple of other bags. They were inside the 
apartment. After him and Rebecca were arrested, the apart-
ment owner didn't want the bags left there, so he requested 
that we take them. And I booked them into our evidence. 
Q. [Prosecutor:] And were they taken to the lab? 
• * * 
A. They were examined. 
• * * 
A. There was one shirt that was mentioned, I believe, as 
the suspect wearing that night. And that was a black shirt 
that had "heavy metal shop" on it. 
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Q. Was that one of the ones that was taken out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the result of that examination? 
A. After the examination, no blood was located on that 
clothing. 
(R. 1003-004.) 
The testimony lacked foundation. Kiriluk objected and also 
requested a mistrial on the basis that the state failed to dis-
close the existence of the serology test results prior to trial. 
(R. 1004; 1019-1023.) The court rejected Kiriluk's objections and 
admitted the testimony into evidence. (R. 1004-05; 1023.) 
The trial court's ruling was in error for the following 
reasons: The state failed to provide continuing discovery; and 
the state's evidence lacked foundational support in that it 
violated the standards set forth in Rimmasch. Kiriluk was denied 
the opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness familiar 
with the test results since the state failed to either present 
into evidence the content of a report concerning the serology 
test, or the lab technician who conducted the test. 
A. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE CONTINUING DISCOVERY AND TO 
CORRECT MISINFORMATION. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "imposes a duty 
on the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the defense on 
request. This duty is continuing and applies whether a prosecutor 
is responding to a court order or is voluntarily producing 
information." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1242-43 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993) (prosecutor violated duty by 
failing to disclose that substance of witness' testimony changed 
on the eve of trial from that contained in pretrial interviews); 
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State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994) (the state has the 
duty to comply with discovery requests fully and forthrightly). 
[W]hen the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a 
request under subsection (a)(5) [of Rule 16] without 
requiring the defense to obtain a court order, considera-
tions of fairness require that the prosecution respond to 
the request in a manner that will not be misleading. 
• * * 
Therefore, if the prosecution agrees to produce certain 
specified material and it later comes into possession of 
additional material that falls within that same specifi-
cation, it has to produce the later-acquired material. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). 
In this matter, Kiriluk made timely, repeated requests for 
scientific results including serology tests on the shirt. (R. 43-
45; 133-37.) The state represented that it provided all requested 
information to the defense. However, it never disclosed the 
results of the test prior to trial. (R. 69-70; 1004-05; 1017-
20.) In disregard for its on-going duty to supplement discovery 
requests, the state failed to disclose the shirt was tested and 
the content of a serology report related to the shirt. (R. 1004-
005.) At trial, the state acknowledged the significance of the 
test when it elicited testimony from its witness that the shirt 
came up negative for blood. (Id.) The state acknowledged that it 
had violated the discovery rules, but argued such a violation was 
irrelevant since "nothing was found. There was nothing to get." 
(R. 1019; 1004.) 
The state's attitude reflects a disregard for procedural 
fairness. Because the state was in blatant violation of its duty 
to provide continuing discovery, it was improper to allow the 
state to elicit testimony from Carr concerning the shirt. 
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The state's conduct undermined the purpose of the discovery 
rules; that is, the elimination of unnecessary technicalities and 
the removal of the element of surprise or trickery so that the 
parties and the finder of fact may determine the facts and 
resolve the issues directly, fairly and as expeditiously as 
possible. See Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967). 
[A] criminal proceeding is more than an adversarial contest 
between two competing sides. It is a search for truth upon 
which a just judgment may be predicated. Procedural rules 
are designed to promote that objective, not frustrate it. 
When a request or an order for discovery is made pursuant to 
[the discovery rules], a prosecutor must comply. To meet 
basic standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a 
real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the 
parties to win, a defendant's request for information which 
has been voluntarily complied with, or a court order of 
discovery must be deemed to be a continuing request. And 
even though there is no court-ordered disclosure, a 
prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered 
inculpatory information which falls within the ambit of [the 
discovery rules], after the prosecution has made a voluntary 
disclosure of evidence might so mislead defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). Such a violation 
infringed on Kiriluk's due process rights, where it effectively 
denied him the opportunity to prepare a cross-examination 
concerning the integrity of the test results. See State v. 
Christmas, 529 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. 1975) (it would be manifestly 
unfair for opposing counsel in criminal case to come to court on 
the day of trial with test results theretofore unseen by other 
party). The supplemental discovery information was improperly 
withheld from the defense in violation of Rule 16(a). 
B. CARR'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SEROLOGY TEST RESULTS 
VIOLATED THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN RIMMASCH. 
As set forth in Point III.A., supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
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in Rimmasch and Crosby determined the standard by which the 
admissibility of scientific evidence is to be judged. Here, the 
state was required to show the admissibility of serology test 
results as set forth in Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 (proponent must 
show (1) the inherent reliability of underlying techniques; (2) 
proper application of techniques; (3) that evidence would be more 
probative than prejudicial). 
Carr had no apparent qualifications that would allow him to 
testify that blood was not found on the clothing. In addition, 
the state presented no evidence concerning the underlying 
techniques used in determining the matter. The state made no 
effort to prove whether the scientific principles here were 
inherently reliable, or whether such principles were properly 
applied in this case. Also Carr's testimony was more prejudicial 
than probative. It appeared to be based on the out-of-court 
statements of an unidentified declarant, perhaps a chemist.9 
The state's approach imputes the undisclosed technician with 
an aura of infallibility that is inconsistent with the adversary 
process, and elevates his importance, emphasizing the prejudicial 
impact of presenting scientific evidence without adequate 
foundational basis. The careful exploration that needed to be 
made in this case was disregarded by the trial court in its 
entirety, making admission of the evidence improper. 
C. ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE UNDISCLOSED SEROLOGY TEST 
PREJUDICED KIRILUK. 
9
 Such evidence is also inadmissible under the hearsay rules. 
See Utah R. Evid. 802-804 (1998) . 
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Kiriluk was prejudiced by the trial court's admission into 
evidence of the serology test results. Salt Lake City v. 
Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993) . Because the state 
failed to disclose the results prior to trial, and to make a 
witness available to testify with respect to techniques and 
processes used in determining whether blood was found on the 
shirt, Kiriluk was not afforded an adequate opportunity to 
explore the issue at trial. 
The evidence tended to establish the state's theory that 
Kiriluk was involved in inflicting the fatal wounds. Yet all of 
the evidence on that point was circumstantial, in conflict, 
inconclusive and plagued with credibility concerns. See Points 
I.B., II.C., and III.B., supra. The jury may have relied on the 
improper testimony to resolve conflicts and to convict Kiriluk. 
Finding blood on Damon's shirt was important to Kiriluk's 
defense that he did not commit the murder. Where the results were 
in issue and used against Kiriluk, impartiality and fairness 
required that the persons, who tested for the results, be 
available to Kiriluk in order that he may question the integrity 
of the process and the authenticity of the evidence against him. 
The state had lab results and testing at its disposal; Kiriluk 
had no way of challenging procedures used to determine the 
integrity of the testing. The defense was not given the 
opportunity to fully and fairly prepare its case. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADMONISH THE JURY TO 
DISREGARD INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY, 
During trial Rebecca testified that Damon told her Kiriluk 
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murdered Brown. (R. 930-31.) Damon was charged with the murder 
but had not been tried. He did not testify in Kiriluk's case. 
After Rebecca testified, counsel for Kiriluk moved to strike the 
testimony and requested a curative instruction. The trial court 
acknowledged the hearsay aspects of the statements and agreed to 
give a cautionary instruction to the jury. (R. 934; 942.)10 
Later the trial court declined to give the admonition unless 
counsel submitted a proposed instruction to be included in the 
jury charge. (R. 974-75.) When a proposed written instruction was 
not submitted, the trial court determined Kiriluk had waived his 
remedy. (R. 1177.) 
Significantly, Kiriluk has not waived the issue concerning 
inadmissibility of the hearsay testimony. See State v. Harmon, 
Case No. 960407 slip op. 6-10 (Utah April 7, 1998) (court deter-
mined merits of admissibility issue, where counsel did not object 
during testimony, but made motion after witness testified). The 
trial court's refusal to provide a remedy was in error. 
It would have been entirely appropriate for the trial court 
to admonish the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay as 
evidence. Such a curative instruction could have served to 
mitigate the damage caused by the inadmissible testimony. 
"[C]urative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of 
our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which 
10
 Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) (1998) defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." 
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a court may remedy errors at trial." Harmon, slip op. at 15-17. 
Also, 
Such instructions are curative instructions that trial 
judges routinely give during the presentation of evidence as 
well as at the end of trial, before the jury deliberates. 
If a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few 
trials would be successfully concluded. 
Id. at 15. This matter was unusual in that the trial court 
initially agreed to provide the remedy, then later required 
Kiriluk to submit the curative instruction in writing or waive 
the remedy. Such a tactic serves no practical purpose since a 
written instruction was not necessary to preserve the issue for 
appeal. If such tactics were permitted routinely, they would 
unnecessarily allow courts to hold rulings on evidentiary 
objections hostage, rather than to make use of the "important 
tool" already available, and at the court's disposal. 
Indeed, it is common for the trial court to provide a cura-
tive instruction without receiving it in writing first. In 
Harmon, the court provided a "forceful, explicit" instruction 
from the bench in response to defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court ruled it was an appropriate remedy. 
Here, counsel specifically requested a curative instruction. 
By failing to provide it, the trial court erred. 
In the alternative, the trial court committed plain error by 
failing to take appropriate measures to mitigate damage that 
occurred by allowing the obviously inadmissible testimony. Under 
the plain error doctrine, this Court may take "'notice of plain 
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errors affecting substantial rights.'" State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 
712, 715 (Utah App. 1997) (cite omitted). 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that "(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." 
Id. (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). The doctrine considers 
whether the trial court failed to engage in conduct that was 
required under the law in existence at the time of the act in 
question. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996) . 
An error existed here. The court allowed inadmissible 
hearsay into evidence. Pursuant to Rule 802, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law 
or by these rules." The law does not provide an exception for 
Damon's out-of-court statements implicating Kiriluk in the 
offense. See Utah R. Evid. 803, 804 (1998). 
In addition, the statements affected substantial rights. 
Kiriluk's confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment of the 
federal constitution and art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution 
were violated. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1989)). 
Those provisions provide all who are criminally accused with 
the right to confront witnesses. Under the constitutional 
provisions, the state is required to make two showings before 
submitting hearsay testimony into evidence: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally 
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his 
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia 
of reliability." 
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Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980); see also Menzies, 889 
P.2d at 402; State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539, 542 (Utah 1981); 
Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). 
Whether "unavailability" and the admission of hearsay 
testimony will infringe on the right of confrontation depends on 
the role a particular witness plays in the prosecution's case. 
"Testimony providing cumulative evidence, or addressing a portion 
of the prosecution's case that the defense has not disputed or 
does not intend to dispute, might be admitted more readily than 
testimony not sharing these characteristics." Ecker v. Scott, 69 
F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1995). 
When witnesses provide conflicting testimony, conventional 
wisdom suggests the constitutional provisions require the state 
to produce the declarant and allow the jury to evaluate demeanor. 
Trial courts should take care to ensure that the omission of live 
cross-examination at trial does "not tip the balance...against [] 
defendant." U.S. v. Faison, 679 F.2d 292, 297 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
In Bruton, 3 91 U.S. at 123, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the Solicitor General's statements at trial that co-
defendant both confessed to his involvement in the offense and 
inculpated defendant. The Court relied on the Confrontation 
Clause and asserted that admission of the hearsay testimony 
violated defendant's right of cross-examination secured by the 
6th Amendment. Id. at 127-28. 
In this matter the state had the burden of proving Damon's 
unavailability to testify against Kiriluk and the reliability of 
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the hearsay statements. The state specifically failed to show 
"indicia of reliability" since the statements were inadmissible 
under the hearsay rules. See Utah R. Evid. 801-804.11 
Kiriluk has satisfied factors (i) and (ii) of the plain 
error doctrine. With regard to factor (iii), Rebecca's testimony 
prejudiced Kiriluk. She presented hearsay statements implicating 
Kiriluk as the person who committed the murder. As set forth at 
Points I.B. and II. C , the state relied on circumstantial 
evidence and presented a case replete with credibility issues. 
The hearsay testimony tipped the balance against Kiriluk by 
allowing the state to present compelling testimony directly con-
necting Kiriluk to the offense, while simultaneously preventing 
him from confronting the witness. The jury likely relied on such 
statements in convicting Kiriluk. "Plainly, the introduction of 
[codefendanf s statements] added substantial, perhaps even 
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject 
to cross-examination, since [codefendant] did not take the 
stand." Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127-28. The conviction should be 
reversed and the case should be remanded for a new and fair 
trial, omitting use of the unconstitutional hearsay testimony. 
POINT VI. THE NUMEROUS ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN THIS 
CASE COMPEL REVERSAL UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE. 
11
 The state claimed it was entitled to elicit the hearsay 
testimony on re-direct because counsel for Kiriluk opened the door 
to the matter and asked Rebecca on cross-examination about 
statements her husband made to her after the murder. (R. 973-74.) 
Significantly, the defense elicited testimony from Rebecca that 
Damon made statements against his own interests. (R. 927.) Such 
statements should not serve as a basis for permitting the state to 
present inadmissible evidence on re-direct. 
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Evidence implicating Kiriluk in the commission of the murder 
in this case was circumstantial, in conflict and inconclusive. In 
the event some of the errors alone may be harmless, the cumula-
tive effect of the errors and irregularities requires reversal. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 
1990); see also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. Here the trial court 
compensated for the state's lack of direct evidence by allowing 
evidence that (1) Kiriluk provided inconsistent information to 
Carr during interrogation, among other things (Point I); (2) 
items with a reference to meth were found in Kiriluk's room, 
supporting motive (Point II); (3) a liquid found in Kiriluk's 
room constituted a precursor used in the production of meth, 
supporting motive (Point III); (4) no blood was found on Damon's 
shirt, supporting the determination that Kiriluk inflicted the 
fatal wound (Point IV); (5) Kiriluk fatally wounded Brown (Point 
V). The errors alone and together should undermine this Court's 
confidence that "a fair trial was had." State v. Finlayson, slip 
op. at 16, Case No.960387 (Utah App. April 2, 1998) (quoting 
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 
940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997). This matter should be reversed and 
remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
Kiriluk respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
judgment in this case and remand the matter to the trial court 
for a new trial. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts* 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the-evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
ARTICLE Vm. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement* is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if. 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the patty's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identi-
fication, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness* 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes 
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, 
reports, records, or data comp ations, in any form, kept in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the 
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compi-
lations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities 
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law 
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal 
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, 
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal 
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of 
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a 
public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data 
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office 
or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, 
or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, state-
ment, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, 
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or 
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept 
record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact con-
tained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony 
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other 
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law 
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of 
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, 
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or 
the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of 
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by 
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record 
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of 
documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in 
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, 
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been 
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in exist-
ence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabula-
tions, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and 
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. Tb the extent called to the attention of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established 
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other 
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, 
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general 
history important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), 
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not 
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for 
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect 
admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by 
evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
JLule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
*FV (a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
rations in which the declarant: 
? (1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
< (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
i% (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
efc
 (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
gthen existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state-
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
;, A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be'likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
#** (b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
;-c (c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
^o the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
j^oisanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
*cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
^prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
it (d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
• (e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
•make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
' (f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
* (2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
3
 (7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
'f' (8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
8hall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 





[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM B 
THIS IS AN INTERVIEW BEING CONDUCTED AT THE METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
JUSTICE ON 03/26/96, AT 0045 HOURS. I'M DETECTIVE CARR, ALSO PRESENT IS 
JOHN KIRILUK, RIGHT? 
A. Kiriluk. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. KIRILUK, COULD YOU... (Det. Carr) 
A. Kir luk. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. OKAY, COULD YOU SPELL THAT FOR ME? (Det. Carr) 
A. K-I-R-l-L-U-K. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. L-U-K, OKAY. AND WHATS YOU'RE DATE OF BIRTH? (Det. Carr) 
A. 05/12/71. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Okay, Mr. Kiriluk uh, like I explained to you before uh, gonna read you your 
rights and then just gonna ask you a few questions about Mike. Things of the past, 
when you last saw him, things of that nature. Okay? You do have the right to 
remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You do have the right to have an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney, one 
will be appointed, free of charge, to represent you before any questioning. You can 
decide at any time to exercise these rights and not make any statements or uh, 
continue with the conversation. Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. At, do you understand those rights? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. On the way down here, we were talkin about how you met Mike. Can you 
just go over it again, give me a little background on... (Det. Carr) 
A. I was up at Hy & Mike's, that's uh, with uh, couple friends of mine. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. 'Bout how long ago? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's probably three and a half, three months ago. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Three and a half, three months. And, he was playin pool, you were playin pool? 
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(Det Carr) 
A. He was up there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. And he knew uh, this guy named Kirk Cooley, he's now (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Kurt or Kirk? (Det Carr) 
A. Kirk. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So K-l-r-k? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, and we were back down south. And they knew each other from shootin pool 
up there all the time.- (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. And I knew Kirk because my good friend is datin his sister. So that's how, that's... 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Inaudible) (Det. Carr) 
A. How that evolved. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Who would be your good friend that's datin the guy's (Det. Carr) 
A. Sterling. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, Sterling is dating... (Det. Carr) 
A. Kirk's sister. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Kirk's sister. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. And Kirk knows, no, er, Mike... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Now, okay?...explain that about Thumper? (Det. Carr) 
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That's his like, you know, that's what I call him. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Street name? Tag? (Det. Carr) 
A. Tag. Just tag. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And... (Det. Carr) 
A. He's... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What kind of guy was Mike? (Det Carr) 
A. Quiet. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, he really didn't talk much, didn't... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Didn't bother anyone? (Det. Carr) 
A. Didn't do anything. Uh, didn't like my Saber. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, was content to sit there and have his girlfriend hate him and (Inaudible) happy, 
you know? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, did, did Mike have a temper at all or anything? (Det. Carr) 
A. He got irritated at... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Over little things or... (Det. Carr) 
A. Little things uh, he set up other people. Uh, if I was in a bad mood, he'd get in a 
bad mood. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Just because. (Det. Carr) 
A. Just because. Uh, that type of person. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did ya ever see him get in a fight or.... (Det. Carr) 
A. Never saw him get in a fight. (John Kiriluk) 
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Never ever? (Det. Carr) 
A, Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh... (Det Carr) 
A. 'Cause most the time when I saw him busy they're playin pool or he'd, I'd picked 
him up and he didn't like this, watch TV, just kick back and bullshit. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. The house, thaf s where... (Det Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. The apartment (Det Carr) 
A. Yeah. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Where we came? Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) • 
Q. And that's you're apartment, alone? (Det. Carr) 
A. No, I have a roommate. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. What's your roommate's name? (Det. Carr) 
A. Chance. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Janice? (Det Carr) 
A. Chance. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, Chance. Okay, I'm sorry. (Det Carr) 
A. Chancelyn with (Inaudible) (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And was, was Chance there? (Det Carr) 
A. Uh, she'd been there from time to time. She has her own life. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. So you, you guys are just strictly roommates? (Det Carr) 
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A. Strictly roommates. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. That's, that's it? Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Friends. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Friends, too? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. But she has her road, I have my road... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. They don't cross all that often? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't, I don't like a lot of the people she knows. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Uh, did Mike know Damon? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Had he ever met Damon or... (Det Carr) 
A. Uh, he met him twice. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Does Damon hang out at your apartment? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, when I bumped into Autumn, you know, as I, "Christ, we gotta do something 
now."1 So they hung out for two days and went home. They came back, you know, 
that type thing. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Wh..where did you bump into Autumn at? (Det. Carr) 
A. I bumped into her up at Dana's house. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Uh, Okay. Uh, now Autumn is an old friend of yours, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. Old family. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Old family friend, (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. You've known her for years, and Autumn is married to Damon. And Damon's last 
name is Munford? (Det. Carr) 
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Munford. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. M-U-N? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. F-O-R-D? (Det Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, 'bout how old is he? (Det. Carr) 
A. Twenty-nine. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Twenty-nin...oh, Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) thirty, twenty-nine, thirty. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. I mean I just started gettin to know Autumn again. I haven't seen her since I was 
twelve years old. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You met her, you bumped into her again, how many days ago? Er... (Det. Carr) 
A, It would be two and a half weeks ago. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Two and a half weeks? (Det. Carr) 
A. Two and a half (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. They come down, have dinner, we have beers and party and... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Make (Inaudible) foods or I do some drawing and glass art. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Stuff like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. Just, bullshit. (John Kiriluk) 
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Uh, we, Mike was found up in the foothills of Bluffdaie. Do you know where that's 
at? Do you know where Bluffdaie's at? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's out by Sandy... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, west way west of Sandy, also south. Do you know where Riverton's at? (Det 
Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q- Okay, uh, Bluffdaie is kinda south-west of Riverton. (Det Carr) 
A. Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, out towards that corner of the county. (Det. Carr) 
A. Out by the prison? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, west of the prison. (Det Carr) 
A. Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. West of the prison. Uh, he was found on Friday at about three pm. Okay, by some 
people that were uh, driving a four-wheel drive up through foothills. Uhm, so they 
contacted the Sheriffs Office, naturally, and uh, we responded uh, when we found 
out who he was uh, that's where we started our investigation. We found out who 
his parents were. So we go an talk to the parents and the parents said that uh, well 
two things: they said uh, uh, Rhonda, Rhonda Hansen, which is Mike's old girlfriend, 
Okay? Now maybe you, you might have seen Rhonda or something.... (Det. Carr) 
A. I only saw, I only saw one girl at his house, once. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Once? If, if I show ya a picture, do you think you'd be able to recognize her? (Det 
Carr) 
A. She had long brown hair. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's, that's... (Det. Carr) 
A. Not the girl I saw. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's not the girl you saw there? (Det Carr) 
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A. It must have been his buddies girlfriend or somethin. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. His buddies? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah, we stopped by uh, one afternoon and he was shootin his basketball with 
somebody. (Inaudible) found out who he was. His parents were gone, the house 
was locked. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. 'Cause he was gonna let me borrow some stuff and "'I can't get in.'" I'm like, what 
kind of parent don't let ya get into your own (Inaudible)? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Laughter) yeah. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I don't know, but it happens. (Det. Carr) 
A. Never, never got her name. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Nothin like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, so we go and we, we talk to the parents and they said, "'Well, the, the 
last time that we saw uh, Mike was on Thursday night at nine pm when he left with 
uh, you and Damon. Okay? Uh, agaL.it was in Damon, Damon has the Nova, 
right? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, and you drive the Escort? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And we, we chatted with Rhonda, too. Uh, that was uh, that was the next 
day. Anyway, that was, that was the last time that, that they saw Mike leave, wh, 
what did you guys do? (Det. Carr) 
A. We went up there to shoot pool. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. At Hy & Mike's? (Det. Carr) 
96-36604 8 
Uh, no went down to Cushion & Cue. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Where's, where's Cushion & Cue? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) uh, 30th & State. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. Yeah. Right uh, by Sociables, right? (Det Carr) 
A. No, down, if s closer to Village Inn and Greasy Catering. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. Yeah. (Det. Carr) 
A. And... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Blue building or something like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah, blue and white. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Blue and white. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Across the street from, what's that, Golden Spike, (Inaudible) whatever. (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Silver Spike. Silver Spike. No. Golden... (Det. Carr) 
A. Golden Spike. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Golden Spike, there we go. (Det. Carr) 
A. And musta watch you all do uh, prostitution bust over there... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Laughter) Oh.. (Det. Carr) 
A. Everybody be at the windows. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's, that's a favorite place for 'em, you know? Ya gotta go with your hot spots. 
(Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah, we went down there and uh, 'cause Damon had to go to work later on. (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
9 
And uh... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Wha, now was it just you three? (Det. Can*) 
A. Yeah, just us three. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Just, Okay. Wha... (Det. Carr) 
A. Just us three. Guys night out. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Was, was Mike seemin upset or anything? Somethin seemed to bother him uh,.. 
(Det. Carr) 
A No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Was he pretty cool? (Det. Carr) 
A. He was pre-occupied. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. With, did he say what? (Det. Carr) 
A. Why I had to take him up to uh, Denny's, there above uh, Hy & Mikes, where was 
that, what was that, 94th and 7th? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, there's the Hy & Mike's on... (Det. Carr) 
A. When I say "Hy & Mike's", I'm talkin about the 92 & 7th. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Yeah. 92 & 7th. (Det. Carr) 
A. Because the 33rd and 30th East is a bad place. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. I know. There's, there's been a few things that have happened up there. 
(Det. Carr) 
A. That reminds me of stabbing (Inaudible) that goes back to Ft. Bragg. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Laughter) (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah, we had a murder up there not to long ago, as a matter of fact. (Det. Carr) 
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I went walkin in and there was a quarter pound of weed layin on... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. (Inaudible) (Det. Carr) 
A. The sidewalk. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. Big ole brick. Just laying there. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Now, I, I, Mike's already dead, so, his parents knew that he did drugs. I knew that 
he did drugs. Okay? He, he was into a little bit of crank and a little bit of uh, 
marijuana. Did you, did you know him to do anything else? (Det. Carr) 
A. He was a runner. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. He was a runner? So he'd mule for people then? Is that how he's makin money? 
(Det. Carr) 
A. Probably. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Probably? (Det. Carr) 
A. Huh. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Look, (laughter). Did, did you ever know him to have a job? I guess that'd be a 
better question. (Det. Carr) 
A. Nope. Never asked. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Nev...okay, never asked? He never asked ya to go & pick him up at work or 
anything like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. So you guys go and you're playin pool at Cushion & Cue uh, did you drive, 
did you drive right from Mike's house to Cushion & Cue? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah, we drove straight down there. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Didn't make any stops, didn't go to the bank, nothin like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriiuk) 
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Okay. And you played there for roughly how long? Can you give me a time frame? 
(Det. Carr) 
A. Two hours tops. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Two hours at the most? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, so say, do you... (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, I was like, I got home at twelve, twelve-thirty. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Twelve or twelve-thirty? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah and I, I dropped, him off at Denny's. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. On, which, now which Denny's? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's like 94th and 7th East. The one right up there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is there a Denny's there on 94th and 7th? I'm tryin to think. (Det. Carr) 
A. It's 94th or 98th. It's right there on 7th East. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Which side of the road? (Det. Carr) 
A- Right hand side. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Right hand, so that would be the west side? (Det. Carr) 
A. West, west side, south corner. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. South corner? (Det. Carr) 
A. Right there at the intersection. There's uh... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, that I, I think it's a Dee's. (Det. Carr) 
A. Dee's? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Not a, not a Denny's. (Det. Carr) 
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Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. So that's where you dropped him off at? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. He had to meet Hoagie. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Had to meet Hoagie? (Dei Carr) 
A. Hoagie. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Who's, who's Hoagie? (Det. Carr) 
A. That's who he was gonna meet. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That*s who he knew 'em for. And this, what time would you say ya dropped him off 
at? (Det. Carr) 
A. Eleven-thirty, quarter to twelve. (Inaudible) had to meet him... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh.. (Det. Carr) 
A. And then he was gonna call me. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Later that night? (Det. Carr) 
A. Later that night, next day.. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Was he suppose to do a run for Hoagie that night? Was that your understanding 
or what? (Det. Carr) 
A. That's what I... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Gathered... (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Out of it? Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't ask questions. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. You know, just like you have your road... (John Kiriluk) 
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Yeah, yeah, I hear ya. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. I mean, I've, I've tried, 'cause he was worried about He used to, (Inaudible) before 
when he had his chemical license or farmer license or somethin... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Hoagie did or... (Det. Carr) 
A. No. Mike. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Mike had a chemical license? (Det. Carr) 
A. Somethin. He told me he used to Mike would get him red box all the time. (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. For (Inaudible)? Huh. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Fertilizing for all I know. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. (Laughter) yeah, I, I... (Det. Carr) 
A. You know. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. I know what you're saying. I know what you're saying. So, so you drop him off 
about quarter too or twelve? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. See... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Quarter too? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. Quarter till eleven thirty. Quarter till. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. And then does Damon uh, stay with him or does he stay with, well, wait a 
minute, Damon's... (Det. Carr) 
A. Damon... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Drivin, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. No, Damon's, I took my car. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Oh, Okay, now (Inaudible). (Laughter) Da... (Det. Carr) 
A. Damon, Damon drove us, drove me up there to go to Michael's (Inaudible). (John 
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Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, at his house? (Det. Can) 
A. At his house. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay? Frank was using my car. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, Frank at the apartment? (Det. Carr) 
A. At the apartment... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Using my car. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det Carr) 
A. Okay? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I'm with ya so far. (Det. Carr) 
A. Damon dropped me off at my house and I got my car to go work (Inaudible). (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. From Cushion and Cue? (Det. Carr) 
A. From Cushion and Cue. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So did Damon go to Cushion and Cue? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. With you guys? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. He wouldn't play pool with us. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Cause Autumn was with my girlfriend. (John Kiriluk) 
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Okay. All right, so you did make a stop? You, you said that... (Det. Carr) 
A. No, no, this is, this return trip. It's not... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. We went we went there to play pool because, you know, Frank told me he's gonna 
be home about whenever. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well Frank didn't go with ya, right? (Det. Carr) 
A, No. Frank don't play pool that often. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Well, well I... (Det. Carr). 
A. As you know, you can obviously tell why. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. Well, I'm just gettin, I was gettin a little confused here when you said that 
they came down, and then you left, Okay. So you head back to your place from the 
Cushion and Cue. Get in separate cars at that time, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. I get in mine. Damon goes, "'Come on.,n (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And Damon goes to work and Mike rides with you back out to the Dees 'cause he 
says he's gotta meet Hoagie there? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. What do you know about Hoagie? (Det. Carr) 
A. That's a good question. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
A. Half brothers (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. AH 1 know is that... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And, and, oh, I, I, I need as much truth here as possible, Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. Well I'll put it on the line... (John Kiriluk) 
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Okay. O... (Det. Carr) 
A. Hoagie's a pro cook. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. He's a what? (Det. Carr) 
A. A pro cook. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Pro cook? Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay? Uh, mostly a gallon. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So he's plannin on makin a big batch? (Det. Carr) 
A. Already had some of it done. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And Mike was suppose to do the run for him that night? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. He was suppose to meet him to get a quarter for him. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. That's what I gathered. Would he go get this and get this for me, get this for me, 
a gopher. A goph-runner. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Now I know Rhonda knows this Hoagie, c...'cause she mentioned the name. 
Are you sure you don't know this Rhonda? (Det. Carr) 
A. I've never met her. And my, (simultaneous inaudible conversation) Mike met her 
at (Inaudible) burger, (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) or somethin like that? (simultaneous 
inaudible conversation) (Det. Carr) 
A. He never told me he had a girlfriend or not. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, Okay 'cause they were.... (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) always teasin tellin me he needs to get laid. 
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(John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well they were fairly serious. I mean, they were even like talkin marriage. They'd 
supposedly known each other for about a year, year and a half. She's a seventeen 
year old girl. Doesn't ring any bells with ya? (Det. Carr) 
A. Nope. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Not at (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) not her. And I never heard the name Rhonda from him. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. The only one he used to talk about was Jen. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Was Hoagie at Dees, when you guys got there? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) I didn't see him. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you stay for a while... (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. With him? (Det. Carr) 
A. I dropped him off and I went home. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You, you didn't even go inside the building? That's, that's a "no". (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. The, the tape recorder does not record head shakes. (Det. Carr) 
A. I know, they need to invent one. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. But I'm, Okay. So, he gets out, what kind of car or truck does Hoagie drive? (Det. 
Carr) 
A. Hoagie doesn't have one. He doesn't have his own vehicle. He borrows. (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. He borrows from other people? (Det. Carr) 
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He borrows friends cars uh, supposedly he's got uh, Sportster or... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, it's got skull and crossbones on the gas tank, kinda half chopper. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. But he doesn't drive that to often? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (negative) (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. What's Hoagie's real name? A first name, do you know a first name? (Det. Carr) 
A. I've been told that he's gone, Brandon Curtis. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Brandon Curtis? (Det. Carr) 
A. And Mike told me that and when I heard that, I was like, wait a minute, I saw 
Brandon Curtis like, I was so screwed department, somewhere. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Do you know a Brandon Curtis? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't know a Brandon Curtis. No one I know, knows a Hoagie (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Knows a Brandon.... (Det. Carr) 
A. Or a Brandon Curtis. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. No one. Uh, I know a lot of people. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay, uh, had Mike mentioned anything about Brandon Curtis in the back, in the 
past? (Det. Carr) 
A. Maybe (Inaudible). (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Why? (Det. Carr) 
A. Somebody was after him. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Someone was after Mike? (Det. Carr) 
A. Somebody was after Hoagie. (John Kiriiuk) 
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Okay. (Det Carr) 
A. Okay, and was blaming it on Mike. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. For what? Something do to with (Inaudible) shortage? So did Hoagie think that 
Brand...er, did Hoagie think that possibly Mike was shorten them on somethin? (Det 
Carr) 
A. Could have. But I don't see where Mike, I don't think (Inaudible) Mike would have 
done with, you know, a quarter pound.(John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is that supposedly how much the short was? A quarter pound on what? Are we 
talkin weed or... (Det. Carr) 
A. Coke. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Coke? Okay. (Sigh) (Det. Carr) 
A, That's what Mike told me and that's what J heard... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So, so... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So he wa afraid that Hoagie might get someone after him? Might hire 'em or what? 
(Det. Carr) 
A. No, he wasn't worried about that. He was worried about these people that are 
saying he shorted them. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Do you know who these people are? (Det. Carr) 
A. All I know is, evidence. Mexican Mafia. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. M & M . Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. That's all I know and if you say M & M to me, I'm gonna leave. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. What (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) well, eighty percent of 'em will stab their 
mothers in the back. You know, just to get her dollar uht I don't know. I just, I don't 
like 'em. (John Kiriluk) 
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Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Growed up in Washington and all, I got jumped on before. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Just, not on good terms with 'em? (Det. Carr) 
A. Not on good terms with 'em. I don't judge ail of 'em. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Right. (Det. Carr) 
A. But, you know? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What, so Damon was Autumn and he goes to work, right? Now is he a self-
employed person, is that a good way to put it? Or does he work for a business? 
(Det. Carr) 
A. He, he works for Autumn. He's kinda like uh, I've done some sideline work as like 
taking the escort or the dancer to the bachelor party, as a bouncer. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Right. (Det. Carr) 
A. You know? Uh... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. To make sure that everything stays kosher there? (Det Carr) 
A. And she doesn't get hurt. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Is Autumn a dancer then? Or... (Det. Carr) 
A. She's... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Escort? Somethin along those lines? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Kinda all the above. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, I, I'm not tryin to get her in any sort of trouble... (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah... (John Kiriluk) 
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Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's, I mean, I consider her my sister and it's hard enough for me. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Okay. Okay. I, and again, that's not my concern here. I'm, I'm just trying 
to get a full picture of whafs goin on. If... (Det Carr) 
A. I'm tryin. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. If she wants to be a show girl, if she wants to. be an escort, she wants to be a 
prostitute, don't make no matter to me. Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, what's that? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) girl. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah, as, as long as she didn't kill anyone. Thaf s, that's my main concern. Okay. 
Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, I don't think she's (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. AH right. Yeah, I, I know what you're sayin. (Sigh) (Det. Carr) 
A. So, Mike came to me and told me about what he heard. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Wh...when did he come to you? (Det. Carr) 
A. That was probably three weeks ago. Three and a half weeks ago. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Did he mention any more of it that night? Thursday night? (Det. Carr) 
A. He didn't mention anything after the first couple of times we talked about it. 'Cause 
I needed t... for him to tell me everything that was being said. Then he would call 
my house saying he's got tails. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. People followin him? (Det. Carr) 
A. Two of 'em. One was in a white and red Bronco the other one was in a Ford Espire. 
White, (Inaudible) Fords... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. The new Ford Espire? (Det. Carr) 
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And uh, he went to work with his dad or somethin and they found out where his dad 
worked uh, same thing with his mom. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Do you think Mike stole this quarter pound? (Inaudible) dope. (Det. Carr) 
A. If he did, Pd like to know where, what he did with it I mean, I was always buyin him 
chew and a drink and gettin him somethin to eat, you know, when he was out. (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. Could he use it himself? (Det Carr) 
A. No way. He didn't do that much. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Well, yeah, not all at once obviously but... (Det. Carr) 
A. I, I probably seen him do a gram and a half since I've met him. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. (Det Carr) 
A. He was more chewir>... (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Did... (Det. Carr) 
A. And every now and again he'd take a toke. Smoke a bowl. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. Uh.. (Det. Carr) 
A. And we talked about and he was scared to death. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Did he say that he thinks people are gonna kill him? (Det Carr) 
A. He was scared. People going to uh, Hy & Mike's, askin for him. This is what he's 
tellin me and so I called my family and asked 'em to find out who was tailin him. 
And they came back and told me it was the Mexican Mafia. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Had, had you been mad at him recently for anything? (Det. Carr) 
A. The only thing I was mad at him for was the fact that he got pissed off at me and 
because I was havin one of those days and him and two other people were tryin to 
get him juiced up at the same time. And I blew up. (Inaudible) take me here, do 
this, uh, come here real quick. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. How long ago was this? (Det. Carr) 
23 
Couple of weeks ago. Couple of weeks ago. I blew up. Me and him, you know.... 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Got a steady job and everything and... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. But that was over? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. And that was over. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, I talked to Stephanie Cass. Do you know who she is, right? The one 
that's got uh, ear uh, thing through her lip. (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay. The blond. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. The blond. (Det. Carr) 
A. She's got a nose ring too. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, no, that's one of her friends. She hit, she had pin through the, she said that she 
talked to Mike just a few days before it happened and he says, "'Hey, I'm on uh..." 
Now they call you "Cats", right? C-A-T? (Det. Carr) 
A. K-A-T-Z. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. K-A-T-Z. Okay. He said he was on Katz shit, shit list. And was trying to avoid you. 
Why, why was that? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't know. Honestly. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. No idea why? (Det. Carr) 
A. Honestly. Other than the fact that he wouldn't return my calls, maybe. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. But uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. And I called (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did, did he owe you money? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
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Didn't owe you any money? (Det Carr) 
A. Didn't owe me any money. I called the other (Inaudible) well, he didn't work, how 
could he owe you much? I called on him, like, he used to wash my car. (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. Oh, Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. He uh, he'd help me clean my house, help me clean the, I do maintance around the 
building where I live, pick up the grass & stuff. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. You tell him to do that? (Unidentified Person) 
A. No. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Uh.. (Det. Carr) 
A. He was alwasy there, he was always there. Then after we blew up it was hard for 
me to get in touch with him. And I don't know if he was still mad at me. (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. So this, this Hoagie, as best you can tell, right? Is someone that is named, what, 
Brandon Curtis? (Det. Carr) 
A. Brandon Curtis. As best I know. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Yeah. (Det. Carr) 
A. Believe me. Everyone knows him by "Hoagie", that knows him. But no one that I 
know, knows him. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. And uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. He's a slippery little bugger. All I know he's like, what, five-six, brown hair. (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. Mike was a runner for Hoagie? Right? Gopher? Runner? (Det. Carr) 
A. Gopher, runner... I don't know if he did much of the product itself as in getting 
necessities for. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. And Hoagie's a prop cook, right? (Det. Carr) 
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Pro. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Pro. Okay...(Det. Carr) 
A. Pro cook. Yeah. Which I could find kinda hard to believe since the program's been 
around since like the early, mid seventies. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. Everything comes in cycles, though. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. Now Brandon, ho...now how did you find out that Brandon, someone was 
accusing Brandon of shorten it? Or were they accusing Mike of shorten? (Det. Carr) 
A. They were accusing Mike. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Mike proffered then, right? He was uh, do you know who these people 
were? (Det. Carr) 
A. All I know is Mexican Mafia. That's all I know. I don't know names. (Inaudible) 
would be Jose A and Jose B. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. (Det. Carr) 
A. That's, that's all I know. 'Cause the source of this was coming from... and one of 
the things I thought about (End of Side A of Tape 1.) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, this will be a continuation of the same interview on side 2. (Det. Carr) 
A. One of the things I've thought about is, I was wondering if maybe the Mexicans 
were sayin this about Mike thinkin he was related to Brenda Brown. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Now, Brenda Brown... (Det. Carr) 
A. She's, she's the one that rolled over on the tunnels a couple months back. (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, I'm not aware of that. (Det. Carr) 
A. Oh, you didn't see that on the paper or anything? She got busted for some weed 
and wrote her up on the Mexican tunnels. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh huh. (negative) (Det. Carr) 
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They're pipelines. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah, I, I realize what you're sayin there but I hadn't, I hadn't heard of that, that 
goin on. (Det Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) she rolled. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, was it her and her husband? Were they in it together? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. It was her. Her husband wasn't there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. From what I read (Inaudible)... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. 'Cause I remember a couple that were using aliases a little while ago that rolled 
over on some people. But I, I don't know what their true names were, I only read 
that they're aliases. Drew and somethin like that, Drew and... (Det. Carr) 
A. No, this said Brenda Brown. She got busted for like two pounds of weed or 
somethin like that and just, served it up. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Just on a platter, huh? (Det. Carr) 
A, Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. I could, I could see where that would come from but, then again, you know that's 
just one of my things. Tryin to figure it out. Because he said Mike got to do 
something and he seems like the person that handles suitcase, take the suitcase 
without even looking. Wouldn't even ask ya what's in it. Just slip a piece of paper 
with the address. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. You know? He just. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. He just did it? (Det. Carr) 
A. He just did it and not so much as street smart as in just d...here, you know? (John 
Kiriluk) 
27 
Would Hoagie want Mike killed? To save his reputation with the Mexican Mafia or 
to save his own skin with the Mexican Mafia? (Det Carr) 
A. To save, to save his rep with the Maf, yeah. 'Cause the Maf s running prope dope. 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. So for him to what, redeem himself, I guess you'd say? (Det. Carr) 
A. That's a theory. I mean... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is a good theory. (Det. Carr) 
A. It's a good one. But, you know, I mean, but why supposedly he's known Hoagie for 
like two or three years. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Would Hoagie have, well, I'm, I'm not sayin Hoagie actually did hands on. But 
would Hoagie get someone to do it? (Det. Carr) 
A, Well from what Mike told me about Hoagie, he had the access. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Hoagie did? What do you mean, he had the access? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, well he, rode a Harley. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Well, I ride a Harley. (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) didn't fly, didn't fly colors but associated with 
it and also with the Mexicans and then... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. But would the Mex....would the Mexican Mafia get directly involved in that or would 
they let Hoagie deal with it? (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) they'd look like he's do it. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. I mean, in the drug world you can find anybody to do anything. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What would a killing like that cost? Would you have any idea? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't know. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well... (Det. Carr) 
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I did in the military... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I k.... (Det Carr) 
A. But I don't, I can't put a price on human life. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh... (Det Carr) 
A. You know what I mean? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah, I, I know what you're sayin. (Det. Carr) 
A. But that, that (Inaudible) a hundred bucks. You couldn't get 'em. (John Kiriluk) 
Q, How much is a quarter pound of prope* dope? (Det. Carr) 
A. You're looking at about uh, forty-five hundred. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Street value? (Det Carr) 
A. Well, muler calls, twenty-five hundred. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So that's what the people woulda been out, right? (Det Carr) 
A. 'Cause a pound goes anywhere from ten to fifteen. Uh, all depends on the quality 
of (Inaudible). And from what Mike said this guy would eight screen to start with. 
And he used to make it all the time and then stopped. Got too hot. Uh, I couldn't 
even and I could find (Inaudible) and if I really have to find him, I'll just call the 
family. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, you, your family? Your immediate family, or uh... (Det Carr) 
A. My family. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, I'm part of the Cigarillo* family. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, the Cigarillo* uh, what's, what's that mean? That's uh... (Det. Carr) 
A, New York, Las Vegas, (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det Carr) 
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Detroit. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. I see what you're saying. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. That's, that's my family. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So you're connected? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. I won't.. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Your not connected? (Det. Carr) 
A. I won't go there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Laughter) uh, I won't go there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Inaudible) (Det. Carr) 
A. I mean, I'll go to my family for help for me, you know what 1 mean? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh. Yo.. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. I (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) where else can I get a hundred bucks to, you 
know, to pay my light bill. But, it, it's just like my mom. Me and her, she raised me. 
Dad was gone. She wouldn't do it. You know, she made it on her own. 'Cause if 
you ask them a favor, even if they're family, you gotta do a favor back. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. You're in debt. (Det. Carr) 
A. And, you know, they would want me to come home. And... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Don't wanna go there? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
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I don't. I mean, I've seen, I've seen both worlds. And I like my own world 
(Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. And, drove hard teams and... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is that what you do for a living? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, what do you do for a living? (Det. Carr) 
A. Whatever I can, right now. 'Cause... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Kinda jack of all trades? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. Uh, I'm a local Ford union carpenter. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh. (Det. Carr) 
A. You know, but uh, (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Any jobs out there like that? (Det. Carr) 
A. There's some. There's some but it, they don't pay nothin. Uh, I sell pagers uh, do 
odd jobs, go to yards and pull parts for people. Uh, find people. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. Kinda like an entrepteneur night now. Because I'm debating whether or not I'm 
gonna move. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Outta Salt Lake or just outta your apartment? (Det. Carr) 
A. Out of Utah, go back to my dad's... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Which is? (Det. Carr) 
A. My grandma, West Virginia. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Oh, West Virginia? (Det. Carr) 
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I haven't seen my grandma since I was sixteen. My mom's (Inaudible). Mom's 
gettin ready to move in May. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Sigh) (Det. Carr) 
A. My dad ain't doin to good with my stepdad. And plus I have a lot of pride so I can't 
go askin mommie for help or.. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Tell me what you think happened to Mike? I mean, you know more background 
about this than I do. Okay? Uh.. (Det. Carr) 
A. He was on (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Because of this accusation? Is that a speculation or have you gotten 
information? (Det. Carr) 
A. I, this is the first I've heard of 'em. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A, I mean, Mike was suppose to call me and he hadn't called me this weekend, which 
is typical since we got in that little argument, you know? He says he's gonna call 
me and then two or three days later he'll call me. So I just figured everything was 
ail hunkey-dorrie. Now you're tellin me he was found dead in the foothills. (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. He was. Uh, Sergeant keeps pagin me. Let's go ahead and take just take 
a quick break. Uh, we're going to pause in this inten/iew while I return a phone call 
to Sgt. Townsend. (Det. Carr) 
Q. After approximately a four minute conversation, we'll be starting back up this uh, 
report. Uh, let's, let's stop this for right now, okay, because I've been honest with 
ya, okay? And hopefully, you've been honest me, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. I have. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Okay. But right now we've been keepin within the scope of the murder of 
Brandon, er, uh, I'm, I'm sorry, Mike. Mike Brown. Okay. Uh, we're, we're gonna 
change gears here a little bit and uh, I want ya to remember that the tape is going, 
okay? I want you to remember of those rights that we talked about eariier. Do you 
remember those? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
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Q. Okay. Uh, back at the apartment there has been some narcotics found and some 
drugs found, okay? Also at the apartment, while they were there, people came up 
and were startin to make buys, right, right then and there while, while uh, my 
Sergeant and some other uh, cops were there. Okay? Now this happened inside 
your apartment. You're going to be arrested for that, okay? Now, do, do you want 
any, make any statements in regards to that. Keep, keeping in mind everything 
about you do have the right to remain silent You do have the right to have to have 
an attorney, things of that nature. (Det. Can) 
A. Are you arresting me (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, well, it's going on inside your apartment. Okay? It's your apartment as well 
as Chance's apartment, okay? And it's, I, you don't have to make any sort of hand 
to hand buys but obviously when people are comin over there, when the cops are 
there and makin, and may...you know, comin up to do hand to hand buys, there's 
somethin goin on that you probably know about. Okay? And like I said, don't, don't, 
I, I'm not gonna bullshit you on anything, okay? And I don't expect you to bullshit 
me on anything either, I'd rather you just tell me you don't wanna say anything than 
treat me like I'm stupid. Okay? (Det Carr) 
A. I had no idea (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is that, (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (Det Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) being arrested for it (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is that fair? Well, I, I, I'm tellin you why. I, I, I told you why. (Det Carr) 
A. Is this the only place (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, well, like, like I said, the, the reason being, okay? And, if nothin else, respect 
my honesty here, 'cause I'm not... (Det Carr) 
A. Yourtellin me... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I'm not gonna... (Det Carr) 
A. You explain it, you explain it... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I'm not gonna bullshit ya here. That's what the call was about, okay? The Sergeant 
said while they were there they've arrested four people there. Four people that 
have come up there, tried to make buys, someone came up with a bottle of pills, 
things of that nature, okay? But apparently there was some dope found actually at 
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your apartment. Okay? Now that in and of itself is enough for possession. Bare 
minimal possession. There's not sayin that you're dealin, okay? But thafs bare 
minimal possession. Okay? And that's, and that's what you'd be lookin at right 
now, so again, do you want to make any statements in that regard to anything that 
goes, went on in your apartment that has to do with the drugs that were found 
there? (Det Carr) 
A. I don't. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A, Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Are, are any of those drugs yours? (Det. Carr) 
A. There's some that's mine. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Some, some are yours? (Det. Carr) 
A. There's a little. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you deal in drugs? (Det. Carr) 
A. I sold to friends every now and again. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. But no large scale operation? No, I guess you'd say. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What is it that you sold to your friends? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) speed. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Mostly speed. Marijuana? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's it? No coke? (Det. Carr) 
A. Some...no. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. No coke? Okay. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
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Unless it's, you know, coke-crank. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Coke-crank? (Det. Carr) 
A. Speed. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, is Chance involved in any of that there at the house? (Det Carr) 
A* I don't want to comment on that one. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. That, thafs fair. I'd, I'd much rather you do that than, than, like I said, treat 
me like I'm stupid. So, I mean, that, thafs fair enough there uh, we, we won't ask 
any more questions in that regard, okay? Uh, you know, I realize there's a drug 
trick now and it's, it's common. If s probably a lot more common than just, you 
know, little Miss Mormon thinks, you know what I mean, that she reads about in the 
paper. It's probabaly more common than what I think, is, is that a fair statement? 
I mean, it, it goes on a lot, I mean, I whether it's large scale or small scale or just 
personal use, like you said, you know, a little bit of, a little bit of marijuana, toke in 
a bowl every now and again.. (Det. Carr) 
A. I hardly ever do that. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You don't touch marijuana? Or very rarely? (Det. Carr) 
A, Very rarely. It puts me to sleep. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Well, yeah, or could give ya the munchies. Uh... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) right to sleep. Helps my back, 'cause sleep. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, the stuff they found, is it gonna be in your room? (Det. Carr) 
A. There might be. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. There might be? (Det. Carr) 
A. There might be a little somethin in my (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Nothing big? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. What, what would they find if it was going to be in your room? (Det. Carr) 
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There might be like a little bit of speed. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Little bit of speed? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. Or.... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. When you say "a little", how much are we taikin? (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay. I don't know, I mean, I don't know if I had (Inaudible) little baggies in there 
or not, maybe half of ki. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Ki at the most? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (Inaudible) like that and maybe a little bit of smoke in a bowl. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Were you expecting anyone to come over to your house to sell tonight to a 
friend or anything? (Det Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You weren't expecting anyone? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. So if they came over, that would have been on their own initiative, just, just 
to see? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Right? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yup. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. They wouldn't have been coming there like at your request or anything? (Det. Carr) 
A. Nope. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. I, I think we've got that squared now and outta the way. Okay? Uh... (Det. 
Carr) 
A. I don't call 'em, either. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
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(Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, like I told ya, my main concern is a murder, okay? Uhf that, that's my main 
concern right now. (Det Carr) 
A* (Inaudible) or something? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yeah. Well, don't think I haven't thought about it. Uh, let's go ahead again, take a 
small pause. Do you have any problem with that? I need to return a phone call. 
(Det. Carr) 
Q. After another approximate three to four minute delay uh, this will restart the 
interview. Uh, that was a page from Deputy Steve Winters, with the Sheriffs Office 
Narcotics Unit. Uh, Deputy Winters wished to speak with John in regards to the 
narcotics that were found at, at John and Chance's apartment. John did you talk 
to Deputy Winters on the phone? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And as I understand it, Deputy Winters was asking for uh, consent to search 
your apartment, is that correct? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Did you give him consent to do that? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, again, I and I, kinda wanna move on from this a little bit. You're probably 
preoccupied now. But before we, and we can go back to this, if you like, if you have 
more questions that you wanna ask me uh, you, you can do that. But is there 
anything else that you can think of or any way that you might be able to help us in 
solving Mike Brown's murder? Is, is there any way that you can start askin on the 
streets, start uh, lookin around... (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) be lookin for who? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Do you think Hoagie knows exactly what happened? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's s..., it's a lead, you know? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. It's, it's a possibility? (Det. Carr) 
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You know what I mean? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. ff you were in my shoes, is that where you would start? (Det. Carr) 
A. That's a place to go. I don't know where to start. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. 'Cause like I said, no one I know... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Yo....did you kill Mike Brown? (Det Carr) 
A. No, I did not. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did uh, Damon kill Mike Brown? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. You are uh, saw him alive, Mike Brown alive, between eleven thirty to eleven 
forty-five, Thursday night and that was when he was gonna meet Hoagie. (Det. 
Carr) 
A. I dropped him off up there at uh, Dees. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Dees. On 94th and 7th? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yup. (John Kiriluk) 
Q- Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) real name? He suppose to meet him up there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And your opinion is he got iced, to use the vernacular, uh, for an accusation of a 
quarter pound of missing prope dope, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Sigh) Okay, let's, let, let's go back to what's happenin at your apartment, right now? 
Oh, okay? Well, is there anything you wanna ask me about what's goin on right 
now? Okay? Let's (Inaudible) (Det. Carr) 
A. No, I know what's going on. (John Kiriluk) 
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Q. Okay, I've kinda, it, ya, ya have to understand your, your cooperation is beneficial, 
okay? It's, that's just the way it is. It always is more beneficial to be cooperative 
than uh, not to be, okay? And I, and I appreciate that and it will reflect accordingly. 
Uhm, what, what questions do you have? Anything that you can think of? (Det 
Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Weil, yeah. Uhm,... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. This, this was not my intention, okay? When I came to talk to you tonight. Uh, I 
hope you understand that? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) people... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well... (Det. Carr) 
A. Some people, they don't care about anybody else. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well, I, that was not my intention. (Det. Carr) 
A. No, I'm not blamin ya. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay? My intention was uh, to talk to you because well, you were the last one seen 
with Mike that night and that's always the place where you start, you and Damon. 
(Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) that night. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, what's that? (Det. Carr) 
A. I lose a friend and my house. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, is there anything else you wanna say, right now? Okay? Uh, let's go ahead 
and end this interview. Time is, hey Mannie, what time is it? Time is 0143. (Det. 
Carr) 
96-38604 39 
THIS IS AN INTERVIEW BEING CONDUCTED AT THE METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
JUSTICE, 6TH FLOOR. 03/26/96. TIME IS 0350 HOURS. I'M DETECTIVE CARRt ALSO 
PRESENT IS DETECTIVE STEVE WINTERS, ALSO PRESENT IS JOHN KIRILUK. K-l-R-
1-L-U-K. 
Q. Uh, John, we've, we'd already spoken earlier, correct? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And uh, you'd given me a statement at that time? Correct? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, what I wanna do on, on this tape, is re-read you your rights, are you 
comfortable in that? (Det. Carry 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say, can and will be used 
against you in the court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before any 
questioning. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to you free 
of charge. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not make any 
statements. Uh, do you understand each one of those rights that I have read to 
you? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. John, we found out that Thursday night you left in Damon's pick-up truck uh, 
it was you, Damon, Autumn and Chablis. Along with uh, along with Mike. Is that 
correct? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Let's uh, why don't you tell me where you went from there? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you go out towards Bluffdale? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Went to Riverton? (Det. Carr) 
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A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you meet up with Hoagie out in Riverton? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. It was not Hoagie? (Det Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Who did you meet up with? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) I have no idea (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. 'Cause I was on this, Dude. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Did Damon know where to go to pick up these two Mexicans? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you know where to go to pick up these two Mexicans? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Where did you meet 'em then? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's on uh, 27 West (Inaudible) 27th South there's some little houses (Inaudible)... 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) West (Inaudible) South. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det Carr) 
A. And they were in a car (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What kind of car? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) it's the white Ford Espire. (John Kiriluk) 
96-36604 
No 2 2 
Oh, a white Ford Espire? Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What happened at that point? (Det Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) they stopped (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. But there was (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. From that address? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (Inaudible) Denny's on 6th South (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. 'Bout the one on 94th and 7th? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Why did you drive there? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Well let me put it this way, did you know what was going to happen to Thumper? 
Did you have an idea? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) I just (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. And then (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. These two Mexicans did? Can you start? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What'd they say? (Det. Carr) 
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They said they (Inaudible)... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And then... (Det. Carr) 
A. He was beaten (Inaudible). (Inaudible) and then they gave 'em (Inaudible) a branch 
and said (Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So... (Det. Carr) 
A. So bright-eyed and ... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Only... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) was a little bare spot (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh have, have you talked to Detective Winters about a lab? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't (Inaudible) gettin (Inaudible) just one lab. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is this Hoagie? (Det.Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Who is it? (Det. Carr) 
A. That one right there, the guy's named (Inaudible) is Shaun. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Shaun who? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't know his last name. (Inaudible) Hoagie. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) leave it there because his boss (Inaudible). (Inaudible) I swear to God 
(Inaudible). (Inaudible) the boss, it's probably (Inaudible) you (Inaudible). (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. (Inaudible) (Det. Winters) 
Q. Sure, sure, go free. Go free. (Det. Carr) 
Q. When you went with friends to friends to Riverton, you took, what was the victim's 
name again, Darren? (Det. Winters) 
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Mike Brown. (Det. Can) 
Q. Mike. When you guys took Mike out there, you stopped at one, 12700 hundred and 
27th West, and you dropped him off. Who was it who picked Mike up, originally, to 
take him to get in the car with you guys? Were you guys ail at you one place? 
Where did that originate from? (Det. Winters) 
A. Me and Damon went out to Mike's house. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Yeah, but you, you got picked up at Mike's house on uh, 370 East 9400 South. Uh, 
when, when you guys picked him up, was it your intent to take him to Riverton then 
and address him with these guys? (Det. Winters) 
A. I didn't really have a (Inaudible). (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Well how did you know to meet these guys in Riverton, then? (Det. Winters) 
A. (Inaudible) we was passin down and they called and I tried everything I could 
(Inaudible) (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Who called? (Det. Winters) 
A. (Inaudible) about three Mexicans. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. Three Mexicans called you at home? (Inaudible) they got a (Inaudible) at your 
home? Okay. (Det. Winters) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. So they simple said, you know, get a hold of Mike... (Det. Winters) 
A. Uh huh. But they never told me (Inaudible) they (Inaudible) down (Inaudible) (John 
Kiriiuk) 
Q. Okay. Excuse my ignorance, 'cause I don't understand what (Inaudible) down 
means. (Det. Winters) 
A. The grapevine. (John Kiriiuk) 
Q. The grapevine? (Det. Winters) 
A. The grapevine and then he was callin me 'cause he had some tails on him that were 
calling down at his parents. White. And I'm tryin to figure out who's throwing what 
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into the grapevine (Inaudible). Just laughed him off. So I tried to get him and I tried 
to rectify the problem. (Inaudible) call (Inaudible) they come up here. (Inaudible) 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. So what did Mike say when he got in the car with ya? Weren't you lucky? Did he 
say, "'I don't wanna go.*" ? Any words said? (Det Winters) 
A. "'I don't want any trouble." He got outta the back (Inaudible) he didn't say 
(Inaudible). (John Kiriluk) 
Q. (Inaudible) who originally made the contact with the Mexicans (Inaudible)? Who 
talked to 'em first you or Damon, was it? (Det Winters) 
Q. Damon. (Det. Carr) 
Q. Damon. Who was he talkin to when you first drove up? (Det. Winters) 
A. There was no words. (John Kiriluk) 
Q- No words? (Det. Winters) 
A. They just drove where it's, I was under the impression that he was going to be 
fucked up. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Fucked up? (Det. Winters) 
A. I didn't do it to him. (Inaudible) I told ya that. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did, does Damon's mother still live on Edgewater Drive? (Det Carr) 
A. Who? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Damon's mother. Still live on Edgewater Drive? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't (Inaudible) remember. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, I, I can appreciate the fact that you got a little nervous when we brought 
in that branch. Okay? Because you know where that branch goes. Uh, that branch 
was broken off a tree.... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And uh, that tree... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is right next to where the body was found. Okay? So that can be very damning 
evidence uh, when it, when it comes to that. I can take that branch right there and 
go out to that tree, 'cause the tree's still there, and I can, I'll be able to match it in 
no time. 'Cause what it looks like, is, and correct me if I'm wrong from this, uh, Mike 
tried to run away. In fact, it looks like he tried to climb up into the tree to get away 
from these people. And I'm gonna use the word, "these people". I'm not gonna use 
the word, "Mexicans", right now. Okay? He tried to get away and uh, as he wo... 
he held onto those branches as someone pulled him from those trees. Now, let's 
go back a little bit further, okay? I know that you talkin to a couple of people, okay, 
and this is not just come from one source, you were pissed at Mike because actually 
Mike's a runner for you. (Det Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay? Now, I'm gonna quite the bullshit here, okay, 'cause this is hard facts right 
now. This is murder and this is a meth lab. Okay? Mike's a runner for you, okay? 
And you were pissed at Mike because you thought and him and Hoagie ripped you 
off and you even made the statement, so bold, as to say, a'lf I find out that Mike did 
rip me off of that pro, I'm gonna kill him.'" Okay? You made that statement that 
bold. (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. I did. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So, so you're mad. (Det. Carr) 
A. I didn't. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So you're mad at him, okay? And now you realize, after we've started talkin to 
some more people you need to change your story. Okay? John, I can put you at 
that scene. You have no idea what I recovered at that scene, okay? And I can tie 
you into that scene now with that little tree branch. It's a souvenir. Souvenirs are 
very damning evidence. No one, no one, including me is gonna buy this story about 
the Mexicans. Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Now, I sat here... (Det. Carr) 
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Okay. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And I've tried to play along, as best as I can, but understand something, I've been 
doin murders for four fucking years. I know when I'm getting the shit thrown in my 
face. This is one of the biggest shit piles I've run across yet. It now, don't, don't say 
a word for a minute. Okay? What I wanna tell you is that is so much Hollywood it 
stinks. Okay? There is no meaning of cars with lights flashing on and off and things 
comin down the grapevine and havin this guy walk to his own execution. Okay? 
And that's not gonna match up. (Det. Carr) 
A. (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's not gonna match up, okay. Bare minimum. Bare minimum. You watched 
Mike get killed. Bare minimum. Okay? We're callin Damon in. Do you. think 
Damon's story is even gonna come close to this? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. It's not gonna come close to this. You're right. And Damon was there. He was in 
the truck with ya all night together. You think Autumn's story is gonna come close 
to this? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And, to top it all off, do you think Chablis', she's there in jail right now, she's a 
scared little girl. Do you know why she's so scared? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uhmm.. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. She's scared because she knows what happens out there and she doesn't know 
what to do right now. She doesn't know whether to piss or, or what. She's that 
scared. Okay? Now,.... (Det. Carr) 
A. Well, what (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I don't care, yeah, everyone's scared here, okay? But we, but let me tell ya, I've 
got a dead man and I keep gettin closer and closer. Closer and closer. Now, I 
agree, I don't think he was killed by one person. I think it was two people that killed 
him. Or, at least, one person roughed him up, another person killed him. John, this 
is your chance, right here and now. Right here and now... (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
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I wanna know, did you rough him up or did you kill him? Those, those are your two 
choices, right here and now. Right here and now you've got to say (simultaneous 
inaudible conversation) (Det. Carr) 
A, I, I hit him twice. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You've got to save anything you can do. You punched him twice? (Det Carr) 
A. I punched him twice. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Once in the eye, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yup. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay, knocked him silly, right? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. That was done at my house. I hit him once in my house and I hit him once in 
the truck. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did Damon kill him? You gotta come clean, John. You gotta come clean right here 
and now. Okay? Because I'm not gonna buy the Mexican story. All right? (Det. 
Carr) 
A. Huh. I'm (simultaneous inaudible conversation) you...(John Kiriluk) 
Q. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.... (Det. Carr) 
A. Are you gonna keep them off of me? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I, first off, I need to know what the truth is. Is Damon involved in this Mexican 
Mafia? Is that what we're talkin? (Det. Carr) 
A. I don't know if he is or not. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is, is... (Det. Carr) 
A. All I know is news (simultaneous inaudible conversation) right now. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. You told me (simultaneous inaudible conversation). You need to tell me right now, 
there's, there's two people that did this to him. Two people that did this to him. 
(Det. Carr) 
A, I didn't (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
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One roughed him up. Okay, I'm teilin yat I'm tellin ya right now. One roughed him 
up, the other killed him. (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What is it gonna be? Okay? If you (Inaudible).... (Det Carr) 
A. I didn't take him for a walk. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did Damon take him for a walk? Near that tree? John, this is deep now. This is 
deep. Okay? In fact, if this is a pit, you're down here. The only way you can go 
now is up. Okay? Ifs not gonna seem like much but you gotta start tellin the truth 
here, Man. You gotta start tellin the truth sooner or later. Who took him for the 
walk? Was it Damon? John, ifs a simple, yes or no, Man. Ifs a simple, yes or no. 
(Det. Carr) 
A. It wasn't me. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Let's move on. Okay? I'm not askin if it was you. I'm asking was it Damon. 
There's five people that leave in this truck, right? Two girls, boom, they're drivin. 
Autumn is drivin and uh, Chablis is in the front passenger, then there's three guys 
in the back. That's you, that's Damon and that's Mike. Okay? You just admitted 
that you've, you hit Mike once at the apartment and once in the truck. You're tellin 
me things that are consistent with what I found, so that means that there wasn't 
some involvement there. Okay? (Det. Carr) 
A* (Inaudible) I hit him. When L... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I.... (Det. Carr) 
A. Was at the house. I hit him in the eye. When I hit him in the truck it was way out 
there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. In the back of the head right? (Det. Carr) 
A. Nope. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Where? (Det. Carr) 
A, I knocked out his front tooth, (inaudible) His (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. That's right. Yeah, his tooth was missing. (Det. Carr) 
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That's the only two times I hit him. And Damon took him out of the truck... (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Does Damon... (Det. Carr) 
A. They went walkin and I don't know. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What did Damon tell you when he got back? (Det Carr) 
A. I said, -Here.'" (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What did Damon tell you.... (Det Carr) 
A. He said... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. When he got back? (Det. Carr) 
A. He said, "'Here.'" and he threw me the branch. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. How did Damon sayhe killed him? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What, tell me? (Det. Carr) 
A. He said, "'It's done.'" (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I know. I know. And how did he say he did it? He's not gonna throw, he's not 
gonna throw you a memento and not tell you exactly how it was done. How did he 
say he did it? (Det. Carr) 
A. Had him say a prayer, hit him in the back of the (Inaudible) head, he stuck him. 
(John Kiriluk) 
Q. With a knife? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What kind of knife? (Det. Carr) 
A. Gerber dagger. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. A Gerber dagger? (Det. Carr) 
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(Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Where's the knife now? (Det. Carr) 
A. I honestly don't know. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Where can we find the knife? Is it gonna be in your apartment? (Det. Carr) 
A. If s not my knife? (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det. Carr) 
A. It's, it's (simultaneous inaudible conversation) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I didn't say that. (Det. Carr) 
A. It's their own knife. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. It's whose own knife? (Det. Carr) 
A. It's Damon and Autumn's own knife. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And it's a Gerber dagger? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What size? What are we lookin at? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh, (Inaudible) like seven and a half. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. How, how big's the blade? (Det. Carr) 
A. Blade's probably uh, like this, four and a half, five inches. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What clothes was Damon wearin? That black shirt and a black thing that says, 
"Heavy Metal Shop" on the back? Was that the clothes that he was wearin? Does 
he still have those clothes? (Det. Carr) 
A. As far as I know. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did he change? (Det. Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) he spent the night and they got arrested thereafter. (John Kiriluk) 
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Spent the night where? (Det. Carr) 
A. At my house. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. See, af...what time did this happen? (Det Carr) 
A. I, I honestly don't know. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Think back. What time did this happen? (Det Carr) 
A. We got home at three-thirty. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did you guys go right home right after that? (Det. Carr) 
A. Yeah. We took we took an extra whatever, (Inaudible) or whatever. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did Chablis see this happen? (Det. Carr) 
A. No. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Is that why she's so scared? She knows what happened though. (Det Carr) 
A. She knows what happened. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. How'd you guys know about those hills out there? (Det. Carr) 
A. They knew about 'em. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. When you say "they", who's they? (Det. Carr) 
A. Autumn and Damon. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. They knew about the hills? (Det Carr) 
A. Yes. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. They knew where to go? (Det. Carr) 
A, (Inaudible) she grew up out there. She got married at fourteen and she moved out 
but she lived out there for a long while. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did Damon do this because he thought that Mike had ripped off that pro? (Det Carr) 
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I don't know if he did that uh, (Inaudible) me or if he did that when (Inaudible). I 
don't know. See he was followin Mike there when they to get (Inaudible). (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. (Det Carr) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Did Damon, did Damon tell you what he was goin out there to do? (Det Winters) 
A. He was takin him out there to scare the hell out of him. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Boy, he did that, didn't he? I think, I don't think there's any argument about that. 
(Det Winters) 
A. He was gonna go out there.... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. I'll be right back (inaudible) (Det. Carr) 
A. He was gonna go out there and play with (Inaudible), probably rough him up. And 
I said, "I want him (Inaudible) Mike's." (Inaudible) before I hit him the first time, I 
asked him three times, I said, "Where's (Inaudible)?" (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So then you smacked him? (Det. Winters) 
A. Yes, I did. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And that's how you were (Inaudible)? (Det. Winters) 
A. Yes (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And then you smacked him again in the truck? (Det Winters) 
A. (Inaudible) that's on the way out there. Was in, to knock him out (Inaudible) 
because he (Inaudible) he set down... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Tell me what he said when you guys, how, how did you go about makin the decision 
that you were gonna go for a ride? Who made that decision? (Det. Winters) 
A. (Inaudible) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. And, and obviously Mike didn't say, "'Okay, let's go for ride.'" What did he 
say? (Det. Winters) 
Mike is that passive. His, his tag was Thumper 'cause he's (Inaudible)... (John 
Kiriluk) 
Q. Uhhuh. (affirmative) (Det. Winters) 
A. And when Damon said, "Go like this.'" .357 and .22 and... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. .357 and .22... (Det Winters) 
A. I mean, I'd probably find myself quite intimated too. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So he didn't say, "Get in the fuckin truck.'" What did he say? What were Damon's 
words? (Det. Winters) 
A. He said, "'All right then. You're not gonna answer us, let's go out there to Hoagie's 
house." (John Kiriluk) 
Q. So they assumed, so he assumed that you guys were going out to Hoagie's house? 
(Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. And you guys instead went to the hills? (Det. Carr) 
A. Uh huh. (affirmative) (John Kiriluk) 
Q. What did he say when you guys kept goin past Riverton? (Det. Winters) 
A. Didn't say nothin. And... (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Was he in the back of the truck? (Det. Carr) 
A. And the place where the gallon was given to Mike is uh, right off 2700 West and 
East, a hundred and twenty-six (Inaudible) South. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Uh, a gallon of what? (Det. Carr) 
A. Q^jVSupposedly. I don't know. It was a blue suitcase locked. And I was told that 
nerang out down there. (John Kiriluk) 
Q. Okay. Uh, what I wanna do is end this here, okay? (Det. Carr) 
A. I wanna end ail of this, Man. (John Kiriluk) 
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THE COURT: THANK YOU. I'LL RETURN THIS 
COPY TO YOU ANYWAY. IT'S YOUR COPY THAT I WORKED 
WITH. 
SO IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS APPARENT TO ME IN 
HEARING THE TEXT, OR THE MATERIAL, THAT OBVIOUSLY IT 
IS VERY DIFFICULT TO TRANSCRIBE SUCH A DOCUMENT AS 
THIS. I DID HEAR IT THE SAME AS YOU HEARD IT. 
HOWEVER, THE CONTEXT OF IT CHANGES THE WHOLE MEANING 
OF IT. THE CONTEXT IS A CONTEXT WHEREIN OFFICER 
CARR HAS BEEN PAGED BY HIS SARGEANT, JERRY TOWNSEND, 
AND HAS BEEN INFORMED, AND SO INFORMED MR. KIRILUK, 
AND THERE FOUR PERSONS UNDER ARREST AT THE KIRILUK 
APARTMENT. 
THEY WERE THERE FOR DRUGS. THEY'D COME IN, 
AND ONE FELLOW HAD EVEN PUT A BOTTLE OF PILLS IN THE 
OTHER PERSON'S POCKET, AS WAS TESTIFIED TO BY 
OFFICER TOWNSEND. AND SO OFFICER CARR CAME BACK TO 
THE CONVERSATION AND TOLD MR. KIRILUK THAT HE WAS 
GOING TO BE PLACED UNDER ARREST FOR WHAT WAS GOING 
ON AT HIS HOME. 
AND THEN IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT WAS ASKED 
OF HIM, HE ASKED HIM AGAIN, ON THE TOP OF PAGE 34— 
WELL, I HAVE READ IT ALL BEFORE INTO THE RECORD SO I 
WILL ONLY READ THE LAST SENTENCE. HE SAYS, "AND 
THAT'S IT. AND THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE LOOKING AT RIGHT 
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1 NOW. SO AGAIN, DO YOU WANT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENTS 
2 IN THAT REGARD?" 
3 I VIEW "IN THAT REGARD" TO REFER TO IN 
4I REGARD TO WHAT'S GOING ON AT HIS HOME, AT HIS 
5 APARTMENT AT THAT TIME. "TO ANYTHING THAT GOES OR 
6 WENT ON IN YOUR APARTMENT." IN FACT, THERE WAS 
7 FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THAT CONTEXT. AND THEN HE 
8 CONTINUES, "THAT HAS TO DO WITH IS THE DRUGS THAT 
9 WERE FOUND THERE." 
10 SO ALL HE'S TALKING ABOUT IS, "DO YOU HAVE 
11 ANY COMMENTS TO MAKE AS TO WHAT'S GOING ON IN YOUR 
12 APARTMENT RIGHT NOW?" AND HE SAYS, "I DON'T." AND 
13 THE REMAINDER OF THE CONTEXT THEN INDICATES THAT 
14 HE'S MORE THAN WILLING TO RESPOND. 
15 ON PAGE 37 OF THE TRANSCRIPT, AFTER MR. 
16 KIRILUK HAS HAD A CONVERSATION WITH THE DETECTIVE— 
17 WHAT'S HIS NAME, THAT WAS THE LAST WITNESS? 
18 MR. STOTT: WINTERS. 
19 THE COURT: WINTERS. AFTER HE'S HAD A 
20 CONVERSATION WITH WINTERS TO ASK WHETHER HE'S 
21 WILLING TO APPROVE THE SEARCH, AND HE APPROVES THE 
22 SEARCH TO WINTERS IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, THEN 
23 BACK ON THE RECORD HERE, OFFICER CARR SAYS, "DID YOU 
24 TALK TO DEPUTY WINTERS—" AND I'M READING FROM PAGE 
25 37, NO LINE NUMBER — "ON THE PHONE?" KIRILUK SAYS, 
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1 "YES." AND THEN THE QUESTION, "AND AS I UNDERSTAND 
2 IT, DEPUTY WINTERS WAS ASKING FOR CONSENT TO SEARCH 
3 YOUR APARTMENT; IS THAT CORRECT?" 
4I KIRILUK RESPONDS, "YES." 
5 "QUESTION: OKAY. DID YOU GIVE HIM CONSENT 
6 TO DO THAT? 
7 KIRILUK RESPONDS, "YES." 
8I THE FOUR QUESTIONS THAT YOU INDICATED TO 
9 MR, MR. MAURO, THAT I NEEDED TO CONSIDER IN 
10 CONSIDERING WHETHER TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
11 CASE WERE, FIRST, WHETHER THERE WAS CONSENT TO ENTER 
12 THE APARTMENT INITIALLY, AND WHETHER THAT CONSENT 
13 WAS VOLUNTARY. 
14 THE COURT FINDS THAT BASED UPON THE 
15 TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS, THERE BEING NOTHING IN 
16 OPPOSITION THERETO, THAT IT WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
17 ENTRY, THAT THE MR. KIRILUK DID NOT EVER DENY 
18 ADMISSION, DID NOT EVER SHOW ANY BODY LANGUAGE TO 
19 INDICATE THAT HE WAS DENYING. HE STEPPED BACK AND 
20 OPENED THE DOOR TO ALLOW THEM TO ENTER, AND THEY 
21 DID. AND I FIND NO EVIDENCE OF INVLOLUNTARY CONDUCT 
22 IN THAT REGARD. 
23 THE SECOND QUESTION: DID THE POLICE 
24 REMAIN, AND BY DOING SO EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THEIR 
25 PERMISSION? AND I FIND THE ANSWER TO THAT IS, 
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1 LIKEWISE, NO. THEY CERTAINLY DID REMAIN, BUT THEY 
2 DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION. THE 
3 OFFICERS, BY THE TIME THAT MR. KIRILUK WAS TAKEN 
4 WITH MR. CARR TO THE POLICE STATION, HAD THEN 
5 OBSERVED IN THAT PLAIN VIEW DRUG PARAPHRENALIA, AND 
6 THEIR REMAINING WAS APPROPRIATE. 
7 THIRD QUESTION, WAS A LATER CONSENT GIVEN 
8 VOLUNTARILY, AND THE ANSWER TO THAT IS CLEARLY YES. 
9 THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION SHOWS THAT. DEPUTY 
10 WINTERS TESTIFIED TO THAT. AND THEN MR. KIRILUK, ON 
111 THE RECORD, REAFFIRMED THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS 
12 CONSENT IN THE RECORDED CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY 
13 CARR. 
14 AND THE FOURTH QUESTION, WAS THE BRANCH IN 
15 PLAIN VIEW? AND THERE HAS BEEN NO TESTIMONY IN 
16 DISPUTE OF THAT. OFFICER CARR OBSERVED IT 
17 IMMEDIATELY AND GAVE A SIGNAL TO DETECTIVE TOWNSEND 
18 AS TO THE BRANCH. DETECTIVE TOWNSEND INITIALLY WAS 
19 THINKING THE BRANCH MAY BE MARIJUANA, BUT CERTAINLY 
20 WHEN HE GOT CLOSER TO IT AND GIVE IT A BETTER 
21 EXAMINATION HE COULD CLEARLY SEE THAT IT WAS 
22 EVIDENCE THAT POTENTIALLY COULD RELATE TO THIS 
23 OFFENSE. SO IT WAS IN PLAIN VIEW. IT WAS OBVIOUS 
24 TO THEM WHEN THEY WALKED IN. IT WAS ON A SHELF AND 
25 OBSERVABLE. AND SO THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD BE AND THE 
SAME IS HEREBY DENIED. 
MR. STOTT, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO PREPARE 
AN ORDER DENYING THE SUPPRESSION, SO THAT THERE IS 
AN ORDER IN THE FILE. I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU TO 
PREPARE AN ORDER THAT WILL GRANT THE SEVERANCE OF 
THE TWO CASES. 
MR. STOTT: I GET PUNISHED FOR LOSING NOW? 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU MIGHT AS WELL HAVE 
IT IN THE SAME ORDER, IN ONE ORDER WITH THE SAME 
MATTERS IN BOTH. 
THE CLERK BRINGS UP THE QUESTION AS TO EACH 
FILE. SO LET'S SEE, I GUESS THAT RAISES THE 
QUESTION. THE SUPPRESSION MOTION DIDN'T APPLY TO 
BOTH? 
MR. STOTT: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL ASK YOU, 
THEN, MR. MAURO, TO PREPARE THE ORDER REGARDING 
SEVERANCE, BECAUSE WE'LL NEED THAT IN A SEPARATE 
ORDER. I WAS JUST GOING TO HAVE ONE ORDER, AND 
PREPARE THAT FOR BOTH FILES SO IT'S ACCURATE. THEN 
IF YOU, MR. STOTT, WILL PREPARE THE ORDER ONLY IN 
RELATION TO SUPPRESSION FOR THE KIRILUK FILE. 
MR. STOTT: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: AND JUST SO THAT WE MIGHT BE 
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AWARE OF IT, OUR TRIAL DATE FOR THIS IS NOW AUGUST 
27; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. MAURO: I BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT. 
THE COURT: AND THE PRETRIAL DATE IS THE 
18TH OF AUGUST. 
MR. STOTT: I HAVE THE 19TH, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: YES. IT WOULD BE THE 19TH OF 
AUGUST. YES, THAT'S THE MONTH. OKAY. SO WE'LL 
ANTICIPATE THE MATTER WILL PROCEED AS NOW SCHEDULED. 
MR. MAURO: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AND COURT ADJOURNED 
AT 2:05 P.M.) 
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